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ARTICLES
IGNORING INFORMATION QUALITY
Janet Freilich*
Entry into the patent system is guarded by an examination process to
screen out applications that impose undue costs on the public without
commensurate benefit. To do this, patent examiners rely heavily on various
pieces of information—both provided by the patent applicant and
independently discovered by the examiner—to assess whether an application
should be granted. This Article shows that there are few mechanisms at the
U.S. Patent and Trademark Office for questioning the veracity of this
information, even though it may be incorrect. Rather, patent examination
often assumes that existence of information equals accuracy of information.
Consequently, examiners may rely on information that is wrong and many
decisions about patent grant may also be wrong.
While it is well known that patent examiners make frequent errors, the
existing scholarship is almost entirely about what this Article terms
“matching errors” (where examiners do not find information that actually
exists), when “digging errors” (where examiners find information but the
information is wrong) may in fact be more common. Digging errors have
serious harms: nuisance suits, decreased incentives for research, and slowed
technological development. The matching-digging framework introduced by
this Article not only reveals new errors, it also makes the case that existing
policy tools to address examination errors will not prevent or resolve these
errors. Existing policy tools require that errors be visible to the public,
which is currently true for matching errors but is not for digging errors.
Solutions to digging errors should therefore be information forcing to
remedy this asymmetry; and this Article includes several recommendations.
Further, this Article uses the matching-digging framework to
reconceptualize examination as a system of quasi-registration that defers
many decisions about patentability to litigation. Patents should thus not be
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INTRODUCTION
As COVID-19 spread rapidly around the world in March 2020, a
biotechnology company, bioMerieux, sought regulatory approval for tests to

2021]

IGNORING INFORMATION QUALITY

2115

detect the virus.1 Just days later, Fortress Investment Group sued bioMerieux
for patent infringement and asked for an injunction.2 The case was unusual
not only because of the bad optics of enjoining a useful test during a
pandemic3 but also because the patent in suit was originally developed by
Theranos,4 a company best known for fraudulently claiming the ability to
make diagnostic tests that functioned with mere microliters of blood.5
Further, although the patent in suit was based on Theranos’s fraudulent
technology, it covered bioMerieux’s working diagnostic tests.6 Fortress
should not have sought to enjoin diagnostic tests during a pandemic—and the
patent providing the basis for that suit should never have been granted.
This Article explains why the Theranos patent was granted, and predicts
the existence of many similarly problematic patents, with a novel theory of
examination at the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO). This Article
distinguishes between “matching,” the process of seeking information
relevant to patentability, and “digging,” the process of assessing the
reliability of that information. This Article then argues that patent examiners
do only the former. Put differently, examiners are good at asking whether a
particular piece of evidence exists, but they do not ask whether that
information is true.7
The process of patent examination, when viewed in light of the distinction
between matching and digging, is somewhat akin to how courts assess facts
on motions to dismiss. Courts search for the presence of factual allegations
that match each element of a claim.8 Courts generally accept factual
allegations as true at this stage, in contrast to trial, where litigants argue
vigorously about the truth of allegations.9 As with motions to dismiss, patent
examiners search for the presence of facts matching various requirements of
1. See French Group Biomerieux Launches Three Coronavirus Tests, REUTERS (Mar.
11, 2020), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-biomerieux/french-groupbiomerieux-launches-three-coronavirus-tests-idUSKBN20Y0Z1
[https://perma.cc/58M6BN9C].
2. Labrador Diagnostics LLC v. BioFire Diagnostics, LLC, No. 20-cv-348, 2020 WL
1283393 (D. Del. Mar. 9, 2020).
3. The optics do not reflect the full story of the case. The plaintiff explained that it was
not aware that bioMerieux was working on a test for COVID-19, and it dismissed the suit
upon learning of the test. Notice of Dismissal Without Prejudice at 1–2, Labrador Diagnostics,
2020 WL 1283393 (No. 20-cv-348).
4. U.S. Patent No. 8,283,155 (filed Oct. 8, 2009) (issued Oct. 9, 2012).
5. E.g., Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Theranos Founder and Former Chief
Operating Officer Charged in Alleged Wire Fraud Schemes (June 15, 2018),
https://www.justice.gov/usao-ndca/pr/theranos-founder-and-former-chief-operating-officercharged-alleged-wire-fraud-schemes
[https://perma.cc/5M3V-GHSU]
(“[D]efendants
claimed the analyzer was able to perform a full range of clinical tests using small blood
samples drawn from a finger stick.”).
6. ’155 Patent col. 8 ll. 17–19 (“Where desired, a sample of 1 to 50 microliters or 1 to
10 microliters can be used for detecting an analyte using the subject fluidic device.”).
7. See infra Part I.C.
8. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
9. See id. Facts that are truly unlikely—such as “little green men, or the plaintiff’s recent
trip to Pluto, or experiences in time travel”—need not be taken as true. Id. at 696 (Souter, J.,
dissenting). This too mimics how patent examiners review facts—those that are physically
impossible, such as perpetual motion machines, will not be taken as true. See infra Part I.C.
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patentability and then accept those facts as true, without digging further into
the veracity of the facts.
The distinction between matching and digging can be seen in how
examiners assess the utility and novelty requirements of patentability.
Inventions are only patentable if they are useful.10 To this end, examiners
must review a patent application to determine if it contains a statement of
utility.11 This is a matching task: examiners match the invention to its stated
utility. If examiners find such a statement, the PTO instructs them to accept
it as true, without further assessing its veracity.12 The process of matching,
but not digging into, the quality of a statement can also be seen in the novelty
analysis. Inventions must be novel; they cannot be patented if an operable
version of the invention has previously been publicly disclosed.13 Examiners
search the prior literature for a disclosure matching the claimed invention.14
If examiners find a match, they reject the application.15 The PTO instructs
examiners to assume that the statement discloses a working invention;
examiners do not dig into the statement to assess operability.16
Failure to dig into information quality leads to errors during patent
examination. Examiners make decisions based on the information available
to them, so if examiners cannot tell whether the information is correct—and
it is clear that the information available to examiners is often not correct—
then examiners’ decisions will sometimes be wrong. When information in
the patent application itself is wrong, examiners may erroneously grant a
patent that is not actually useful, enabled, or adequately described (all
requirements of patentability), which may then allow patentees to
undeservedly monopolize an area and block future research that might lead
to beneficial inventions.17 When evidence in the prior art is wrong,
examiners may erroneously reject a patent that is in fact novel and
nonobvious, diminishing the patent reward and commensurate incentives to
invent.18
There is substantial scholarship on errors that occur during patent
examination, which are a major policy challenge.19 However, this Article
demonstrates that existing scholarship focuses primarily on errors caused by

10. 35 U.S.C. § 101.
11. See MPEP § 2107(II) (9th ed. Rev. 10, June 2020).
12. Id. (“Office personnel are reminded that they must treat as true a statement of fact
made by an applicant in relation to an asserted utility . . . .”).
13. 35 U.S.C. § 102; see Elan Pharms., Inc. v. Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Rsch., 346
F.3d 1051, 1054 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
14. See MPEP § 904. Examiners are not restricted to written literature. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. § 2121 (“[T]he reference is presumed to be operable.”); see also In re Antor Media
Corp., 689 F.3d 1282, 1289 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“[A]n examiner is entitled to reject claims as
anticipated by a prior art publication or patent without conducting an inquiry into whether or
not that prior art reference is enabling.”).
17. See infra Part II.C.2.
18. See infra Part II.C.1.
19. See infra Part III.
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failure to find information—matching errors.20 Little scholarship concerns
errors caused by failure to evaluate information—digging errors. This
Article predicts that digging errors will be common because the process of
examination fails entirely to screen for information quality.21
This Article then turns to mechanisms to prevent or fix examination errors.
At the outset, existing policies targeted at fixing errors will be ineffective to
address digging errors because these policies rely on the public to find
errors.22 But errors in evaluating information, unlike errors in finding
information, may be invisible to the public. For example, if a patent states
that an invention works, the public does not have access to the evidence
underlying that statement and therefore cannot easily disagree.23 Further,
errors caused by failure to dig into the quality of information are difficult to
prevent at the examination stage because examiners simply do not have the
expertise, capability, funding, facilities, or time to comprehensively assess
information quality.24 This Article proposes a variety of solutions that (1)
encourage information gathering and (2) place the burden of fact-checking
more heavily on the parties involved in submitting the application.25
The matching-digging dichotomy also implicates the relationship between
prosecution and litigation, both in terms of how this interface is theorized and
for concrete policy proposals. Prosecution is currently viewed as an
examination system, with litigation as a backstop to review errors.26 But
prosecution is actually a registration system where examiners check to ensure
that an application contains all required components but where they do not
dig into the accuracy of these components. Litigation, by contrast, is an
examination proceeding where courts can and do assess the quality of
evidence. Many aspects of patentability traditionally thought to be assessed
during prosecution are thus in reality postponed for evaluation in litigation.
The matching-digging dichotomy suggests that courts should give patents a
presumption of matching (i.e., that the examiner searched for matching
evidence) but that there is no basis for a presumption of digging (i.e., that
matching evidence found by the examiner is correct).
Additionally, prosecution and litigation doctrines should be decoupled.
Under current law, litigants can argue that a granted patent is invalid and
courts will review validity using many of the same doctrines that apply in

20. Matching errors occur when an examiner (erroneously) fails to find a statement
matching the patent’s claims in the prior art, resulting in the grant of a patent that either is not
novel or is obvious. See infra Part III.
21. See infra Part II.B.
22. See infra Part III.A.1.c.
23. See infra Part III.A.1.
24. See infra Part III.A.
25. See infra Part III.A.2.
26. See Robert P. Merges, As Many as Six Impossible Patents Before Breakfast: Property
Rights for Business Concepts and Patent System Reform, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 577, 592
(1999).
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prosecution.27 However, if litigation involves a fundamentally different
analysis, courts should not be constrained by doctrines developed by the
PTO. This Article explains that several of patent law’s more perplexing
doctrines can be understood as shortcuts to transform digging tasks—which
are beyond the capabilities of patent examiners—into matching tasks, which
are more readily accomplished.28 Because these doctrines are concessions to
a weakness of examination that has no parallel in litigation, the doctrines
should not apply in litigation.
A final payoff of the matching-digging dichotomy is to highlight that most
of examiners’ workload—matching tasks—consists of the type of job that
can be done using artificial intelligence.29 Increasing the use of artificial
intelligence might therefore free an examiner’s time to perform more difficult
tasks, such as digging into the quality of evidence.
Part I provides background on the patent examination process. It then sets
out the matching-digging divide by explaining how examiners match but do
not dig into the quality of information. Part II models different types of
patent errors under the matching-digging framework and shows that certain
types of errors will be common results of failure to dig into information. Part
III turns to implications and policy reform, beginning with suggestions for
fixing digging errors, followed by reforms for litigation, and concluding with
a discussion of the potential for automating patent prosecution.
I. INFORMATION AND PATENT EXAMINATION
A. Background on Examination
The purpose of patent examination is to screen out applications that do not
meet the requirements of patentability. Patents impose a burden on the public
in the form of higher prices during the term of the patent, so they should only
be granted if they provide a public benefit by disclosing new and useful
technologies. This quid pro quo—patentees gets the exclusive right to their
inventions in return for providing knowledge to the public—is designed to
incentivize innovation. It gives patentees an opportunity to profit from their
inventions and also adds to the public repository of knowledge.
Each patent undergoes examination at the PTO to ensure that it meets the
requirements for patentability. The invention, which is defined by a portion
of the patent called the “claims,”30 must be novel31 and nonobvious,32
meaning that it has never been previously publicly disclosed, nor is it an
obvious variation of something previously disclosed.33 To assess novelty
27. See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 282(b)(2). Note that some doctrines differ between prosecution
and litigation, notably claims are given their broadest reasonable interpretation during
prosecution. MPEP § 2111 (9th ed. Rev. 10, June 2020).
28. See infra Part III.B.2.
29. See infra Part III.C.
30. 37 C.F.R. § 1.75(a) (2020).
31. 35 U.S.C. § 102.
32. Id. § 103.
33. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 400 (2007).
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and nonobviousness, examiners search the “prior art” (the universe of public
disclosures made before the patent was filed) to determine if the invention or
related concepts were already known.34
The invention must also be useful,35 enabled (disclosed in sufficient detail
such that other scientists can make and use the invention),36 and adequately
described.37 These requirements pertain to information in the patent
application itself, called the “specification.”38 Examiners will check the
specification to ensure that it describes the invention (as defined in the
claims), contains a statement of utility, and includes specifics about how to
make and use the invention.39 This ensures both that the patent goes to an
inventor who has developed the invention to a stage where it is useful and
that the patent discloses enough information that other scientists can develop
improvements and downstream iterations of the technology.
Finally, the invention must also meet certain other requirements, such as
relating to subject matter that can be patented40 and including claims that
clearly outline the boundaries of the patent.41
B. Matching
This Article argues that evidentiary analysis, such as that done in patent
examination, can be understood as a process consisting of two steps:
matching and digging. Part II.B defines matching and explores how
matching is used to assess patentability. Part II.C argues that while the
existence of certain pieces of information is a vital component of the
examination process, the accuracy of that information is not—examiners do
not dig into information quality.
Matching is defined as selecting a statement and searching for a similar
statement documented elsewhere. For example, I propose that “the sky is
blue.” This statement matches to many other statements in other sources,
including a short article by NASA explaining why the sky is blue.42 In the
context of patent examination, matching involves taking the claimed
invention and asking whether evidence of the claimed invention exists
elsewhere.

34. Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kan. City, 383 U.S. 1, 22 (1966).
35. 35 U.S.C. § 101.
36. Id. § 112(a).
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. See, e.g., In re Brana, 51 F.3d 1560, 1562–63 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
40. 35 U.S.C. § 101.
41. See id. § 112(b).
42. Why Is the Sky Blue?, NASA SCI. SPACEPLACE (Apr.
https://spaceplace.nasa.gov/blue-sky/en/ [https://perma.cc/R5aJK-J5WZ].

21,

2020),
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Table 1: Summary of Matching During Assessment of Patentability

Patentability
Requirement

Area Searched for
Matching
Information

Consequence of
Finding Matching
Information

Novelty

Prior Art

Not Patentable

Obviousness

Prior Art

Not Patentable

Enablement

Specification

Patentable

Written Description

Specification

Patentable

Utility

Specification

Patentable

Patents are only granted on inventions that are novel and nonobvious: that
have not been previously publicly disclosed and are not obvious based on the
sum of existing knowledge.43 When a patent application is submitted,
examiners must therefore determine if the invention has been previously
disclosed in a publicly available source—the prior art—or whether it would
be obvious over such disclosures.44 Examiners do this by searching the prior
art for disclosures that match the claimed invention.45 An application will be
rejected for lack of novelty if a piece of prior art matches all aspects of the
claimed invention.46 An application will be rejected for obviousness if each
part of the invention matches some disclosure in the prior art and it would be
obvious to combine those disclosures.47
For example, an applicant claimed to have invented a process for rendering
fruit rind resistant to mold by “subjecting fruit to the action of an aqueous
solution of borax.”48 In order to determine if the invention was patentable,
the examiner had to search for a matching statement in prior published
documents. The examiner found a match: a document published several
years earlier describing a method “to prolong the period of usefulness of
43. 35 U.S.C. §§ 102–103; MPEP § 2131 (9th ed. Rev. 10, June 2020) (“A claimed
invention may be rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 102 when the invention is anticipated (or is ‘not
novel’) over a disclosure that is available as prior art.”). Patents impose a cost on society by
allowing the patentee to charge higher prices for a product. In return, patents disclose
information about technology that might otherwise be kept secret. Thus, patents are only
granted on technology that has not been previously disclosed, because otherwise the cost
would not be worth the benefit. See, e.g., Suzanne Scotchmer & Jerry Green, Novelty and
Disclosure in Patent Law, 21 RAND J. ECON. 131, 132 (1990).
44. MPEP § 901.
45. Id.
46. Id. § 2131.
47. Id. § 2141.
48. Am. Fruit Growers v. Brogdex Co., 283 U.S. 1, 6 (1931).
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fruit . . . . [consisting of] [t]he application of boracic acid.”49 The
application was therefore deemed not novel and was rejected. The examiner
evaluated the patentability of the invention by matching the claims of the
patent application to statements in the prior art.
Examiners also use matching techniques to evaluate the enablement
requirement. Enablement requires that patents provide sufficient information
about the invention so that it can be made and used by others in the field
without undue experimentation.50 To assess whether this is the case,
examiners take each element of the claimed invention and seek to match it to
a description in the patent’s specification of how the element is made and
used.51 If one or more steps is missing from the patent’s description, the
examiner will reject the patent for lack of enablement.52 This is a matching
technique. Examiners take statements from the claims and seek matching
explanations for that information in the patent.
For example, a patent claim was directed to using x-rays to differentiate
types of plastics, a process which, among other things, required “selecting
for processing” the x-ray signals that did not pass through the plastics.53 The
patent specification did not explain how to select those signals—in other
words, the specification did not contain a match for a necessary step in the
claim—therefore, the patent was not enabled.54
Matching also occurs when examiners evaluate the written description
requirement. Written description requires that patents contain enough
information to show that the inventors were “in possession” of the claimed
invention.55 This is presumed to be the case if “the claimed invention is
present in the specification.”56 Determining if the claimed invention is in the
specification is a matching task. For each element of the claimed invention,
the examiner checks to see if matching information is present in the
specification. If there is no match for a part of the claimed invention, the
examiner can reject the patent.57 For example, a patent claiming a method
of conducting debit card transactions using multiple authorization codes did
not have an explanation in the specification that included multiple
authorization codes and thus, was rejected for lack of written description.58
49. Id. at 13. Note that in this case, boracic acid was sufficiently similar to borax, such
that it anticipated the applicant’s invention.
50. 35 U.S.C. § 112; In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 733 (Fed. Cir. 1988). The purpose of
enablement is to ensure that information about new inventions is disseminated to the public
so that others can recreate and improve on the technology. Janet Freilich, The Replicability
Crisis in Patent Law, 95 IND. L.J. 431, 438 (2020).
51. See MPEP § 2164.06(a).
52. Id. (“It is common that doubt arises about enablement because information is missing
about one or more essential claim elements.”).
53. Nat’l Recovery Techs., Inc. v. Magnetic Separation Sys., Inc., 166 F.3d 1190, 1195
(Fed. Cir. 1999).
54. See id. at 1196.
55. Capon v. Eshhar, 418 F.3d 1349, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
56. In re Wertheim, 541 F.2d 257, 262 (C.C.P.A. 1976); see also MPEP § 2163(II)(A).
57. See, e.g., MPEP § 2163(II)(A).
58. Stored Value Sols., Inc. v. Card Activation Techs., Inc., 499 F. App’x 5, 13–14 (Fed.
Cir. 2012).
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Because the specification had no match for the “multiple authorization
codes” portion of the claim, the patent was not valid.59
Finally, examiners use matching to assess the utility requirement for
patentability. Inventions can only be patented if they are useful.60 Inventions
are not useful if they have no purpose or are impossible. Patents should
include a statement about the utility of the invention: an explanation for how
the invention can be used.61 When examining a patent for utility, the
examiner matches the claimed invention to the statement of utility in the
specification.62 For example, a patent application claimed a particular
compound and, in the specification, stated that the compound was useful as
a plant fungicide.63 Because there was a match between the claimed
compound and the disclosed utility, the application satisfied the utility
requirement.64
C. Digging
As shown above, patent examiners search for information matching the
claimed invention in both the prior art and in the patent application itself.
This part argues that patent examiners do not dig into the quality of the
information they find. Although examiners look for evidence of patentability
both in the prior art and the patent specification, they do not assess whether
that evidence is correct.
The strongest indication that examiners are not digging into the quality of
evidence comes from the PTO’s own admission. The PTO straightforwardly
confesses that it does not and cannot determine whether certain types of
information are correct. For example, the examiner in Ex Parte Baker65 cited
a statement in the prior art that a particular antibody could bind to a protein—
59. Id. Examiners also use matching to determine if applicants can amend the claims of
their applications. Amendments cannot introduce new matter into the claims—doing so
violates the written description requirement. See Chiron Corp. v. Genentech, Inc., 363 F.3d
1247, 1255 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“The written description requirement prevents applicants from
using the amendment process to update their disclosures . . . .”). Thus, to determine if an
amendment adds material that is not in the originally filed application, the examiner matches
the material added in the amendment to material already in the specification. MPEP
§ 2163(II)(B).
60. 35 U.S.C. § 101. As with novelty and nonobviousness, society should not bear the
cost of a patent if the disclosed invention has no use or if the inventor does not or cannot
describe the use. See, e.g., Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 534 (1966) (“Until the process
claim has been reduced to production of a product shown to be useful, the metes and bounds
of that monopoly . . . . may engross a vast, unknown, and perhaps unknowable area. Such a
patent may confer power to block off whole areas of scientific development, without
compensating benefit to the public.”).
61. MPEP § 2107.02(II)(A). Patents must have a statement to “fully and clearly explain
why the applicant believes the invention is useful. Such statements will usually explain the
purpose of or how the invention may be used . . . .” Id.
62. The PTO instructs examiners to “(A) Read the claims and . . . . [d]etermine what the
applicant has claimed” and “(B) . . . determine if the applicant has asserted for the claimed
invention any specific and substantial utility that is credible.” Id. § 2107 (II).
63. In re Gottlieb, 328 F.2d 1016, 1019 (C.C.P.A. 1964).
64. Id.
65. No. 2006-2892, 2007 WL 630236 (B.P.A.I. Feb. 26, 2007).
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but the PTO also acknowledged that it could not check whether that statement
was true, explaining that “the Office does not have the facilities for
examining and comparing Appellant’s protein/antibody.”66 In Ex Parte
Reguri,67 the applicants claimed a particular form of valsartan, a drug that
treats hypertension.68 Prior art had disclosed a similar form, but the applicant
contended that it was not a true match because, if the examiner were to test
the prior art composition, it would be clear that the prior art disclosed a
slightly different form of valsartan.69 The Board of Patent Appeals and
Interferences rejected the applicant’s argument and explained that the
examiner could not verify which type of valsartan was disclosed by the prior
art because the “Office does not have the facilities to determine what form or
admixtures of forms” the prior art compound takes.70
Courts agree with the PTO’s explanation that it is unable to dig into the
quality of evidence. In Corning Glass Works v. Anchor Hocking Glass
Corp.,71 the applicant made certain misrepresentations to the PTO.72 The
court explained that dishonesty in PTO proceedings was a particular problem
because “an examiner has no way, in many cases, to ascertain the truthfulness
of the representations made to him.”73 In Charles Pfizer & Co. v. FTC,74
Pfizer presented misleading information to the examiner.75 The court
remarked that this misleading information caused the examiner to
erroneously grant the patent because the “Patent Office, not having testing
facilities of its own, must rely upon information furnished by applicants.”76
These passages demonstrate that the PTO lacks the ability to evaluate the
veracity of evidence in certain scenarios and instead merely assumes that
relevant information is true. However, failure to evaluate evidence is
considerably more widespread, and it permeates every aspect of examiner
behavior. The sections below survey PTO rules and practices to investigate
how examiners assess evidence.
1. Treatment of Prior Art References
Examiners fail to evaluate the quality of evidence in prior art documents
used to reject an application. This occurs because legal doctrine allows
examiners to assume that information in prior art is accurate—obviating the
need to dig—even though there is ample reason to believe that much
information in prior art is not accurate.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
1967).
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

Id. at *3.
No. 2007-0313, 2007 WL 2745815 (B.P.A.I. Sept. 6, 2007).
Id. at *2.
Id.
Id. at *7.
253 F. Supp. 461 (D. Del. 1966), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 374 F.2d 473 (3d Cir.
Id. at 470.
Id.
401 F.2d 574 (6th Cir. 1968).
Id. at 579.
Id.
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When an examiner rejects a patent for lack of novelty or for obviousness,
she will cite to specific prior art references that either anticipated or rendered
the invention obvious.77 This citation indicates that the examiner has
searched the prior art and found a reference that matches the claimed
invention.78 According to patent doctrine, a reference used for an
anticipation rejection must be enabled, meaning that the invention disclosed
in the prior art must be operable or could be operable without undue
experimentation.79 The rationale for this requirement is that inventors should
not get patents on inventions that are already in the possession of the public.80
Further, in order for the public to possess an invention, the prior art must do
more than just disclose an idea—the prior art must teach the public how to
make a working version of the invention.81
However, in practice, the examiner need only find prior art that discloses
the applicant’s invention and need not ask whether the reference discloses
something that actually works.82 The PTO instructs examiners that, if the
reference is used for an anticipation or obviousness rejection, “the reference
is presumed to be operable.”83 This means that examiners must find a
disclosure of the invention in the prior art but can then assume that the
statements are accurate and need not dig into their quality.
The Federal Circuit has confirmed that “an examiner is entitled to reject
claims as anticipated by a prior art publication . . . without conducting an
inquiry into whether or not that prior art reference is enabling.”84 The
Federal Circuit explained that the examiner is not required to investigate
whether the prior art works because “[i]t would be overly cumbersome,
perhaps even impossible, to impose on the PTO the burden of showing that
a cited piece of prior art is enabling. The PTO does not have laboratories for
testing disclosures for enablement.”85 Thus, as long as examiners have found
the applicant’s invention disclosed in the prior art, they need not ask whether
the prior art is accurate—and indeed, examiners generally could not dig into
the prior art’s accuracy.

77. MPEP §§ 2131, 2143 (9th ed. Rev. 10, June 2020).
78. See infra Part III.A.
79. Elan Pharms., Inc. v. Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Rsch., 346 F.3d 1051, 1054
(Fed. Cir. 2003); In re Donohue, 766 F.2d 531, 533 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
80. See Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 148 (1989)
(explaining that the novelty requirement “express[es] a congressional determination that the
creation of a monopoly in [publicly disclosed] information would . . . serve no socially useful
purpose”).
81. In re Donohue, 766 F.2d at 533 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (stating that prior art must
“sufficiently describe the claimed invention to have placed the public in possession of it” and
that, as part of this requirement, the description must be enabling).
82. Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel Inc., 314 F.3d 1313, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2003);
In re Sasse, 629 F.2d 675, 677 (C.C.P.A. 1988).
83. MPEP § 2121(I) (9th ed. Rev. 10, June 2020).
84. In re Antor Media Corp., 689 F.3d 1282, 1289 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
85. Id. at 1288.

2021]

IGNORING INFORMATION QUALITY

2125

With respect to obviousness, there is no requirement that the prior art be
enabled.86 A patent application can be rejected on the grounds that it is
obvious over prior art even if the author of the prior art did not know how to
make the invention.87 Thus, the examiner is free of even a nominal burden
to determine if the prior art disclosure is correct.
Further evidence that examiners do not dig into the quality of information
used during the novelty and nonobviousness analyses comes from the types
of sources used by examiners. Examiners almost always cite to patents,
rather than to journal articles or other types of disclosures, as prior art.88
Patents have no indicators to distinguish good quality patents from poor
quality patents, unlike journal articles, where the journal of publication might
so indicate. Thus, the prior art used most often by examiners lacks indicators
that could be used to evaluate its informational value.
Moreover, examiners are more likely to cite to abandoned patent
applications than to granted patents.89 Abandoned patent applications may
never have been reviewed by a patent examiner, so the quality of the
statements therein is essentially the same as a self-published piece of
writing.90 This practice is explicitly permitted by the PTO, which instructs
examiners to give prior art patents the same evidentiary weight as prior art
patent applications.91
Examiners fail to consider the quality of statements in prior art even when
it should be clear that the prior art is blatantly incorrect. As discussed above,
Theranos filed a patent on a method of measuring analytes in small drops of
blood.92 An examiner cited the Theranos patent as prior art to reject as
obvious a downstream patent claiming a method of measuring analytes in
small drops of sweat.93 The rejection occurred in 2019, long after Theranos’s
inability to make their technology functional had been well publicized.94 Yet
the examiner argued that it was obvious how to measure molecules in small
86. Metso Mins., Inc. v. Powerscreen Int’l Distrib. Ltd., 526 F. App’x 988, 994–95 (Fed.
Cir. 2013); Geo M. Martin Co. v. All. Mach. Sys. Int’l LLC, 618 F.3d 1294, 1302–03 (Fed.
Cir. 2010).
87. Geo M. Martin, 619 F.3d at 1303.
88. Colleen Chien, Comparative Patent Quality, 50 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 71, 121–22 (2018).
89. Christopher A. Cotropia & David L. Schwartz, The Hidden Value of Abandoned
Applications to the Patent System, 61 B.C. L. REV. 2809, 2810 (2020). Applications are
deemed abandoned if the applicant stops pursuing the application. Id. at 2811 n.3.
90. The quality is perhaps slightly higher, since filing a patent costs several hundred
dollars and therefore may dissuade at least some poorly researched ideas. See Jonathan S.
Masur, Costly Screens and Patent Examination, 2 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 687, 687 (2008)
(explaining that the high cost of patent review may screen out low value patents).
91. MPEP § 2121(II) (9th ed. Rev. 10, June 2020) (“The level of disclosure required
within a reference to make it an ‘enabling disclosure’ is the same no matter what type of prior
art is at issue. It does not matter whether the prior art reference is a U.S. patent, foreign patent,
a printed publication [a patent application] or other.”).
92. U.S. Patent No. 10,156,579 col. 24 l. 7 (filed Feb. 26, 2016) (issued Dec. 18, 2018)
(“A method of detecting an analyte in a small-volume blood sample obtained from a subject,
comprising: a) obtaining a sample of blood from a subject by lancing or pipetting, said blood
sample having a volume of less than about 500 μL.”).
93. WIPO Patent Application No. 2018/013579 (filed July 11, 2017).
94. Id.
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drops of liquid because Theranos had already done it.95 This nonsensical
approach shows that the examiner was matching (finding a reference that
disclosed the technique) without digging (evaluating the reliability of that
reference).
2. Utility
A second demonstration that patent examiners are not assessing the quality
of evidence used to evaluate patentability comes from the PTO’s instructions
to examiners on how to assess whether a patent application is useful. As
explained above, patent examiners assess utility by finding a statement in the
patent document that explains how the invention can be used.96 However,
after finding such a statement, examiners generally accept it at face value and
do not attempt to assess its reliability.
Patent examiners are not required to accept the applicant’s assertion that
the invention is useful as true.97 But the PTO emphasizes that rejections on
the grounds that the examiner doubts the veracity of the applicant’s statement
are “rare” and instances of such rejections being upheld by a federal court
“even rarer.”98 Further, although examiners are permitted to request that the
applicant provide additional evidence of utility if the examiner is not satisfied
with the initial statement, such requests for additional evidence “should be
imposed rarely.”99 The PTO allows examiners to dispute an applicant’s
stated utility only where the assertion is “incredible in view of contemporary
knowledge” and not merely where “there may be reason to believe that the
assertion is not entirely accurate.”100 Indeed, the PTO explains that
examiners reject applications for lack of credible utility mainly when the
claimed invention “violate[s] a scientific principle, such as the second law of
thermodynamics.”101 Patents on perpetual motion machines, which are
physically impossible, are filed with surprising regularity.102
To paraphrase, the PTO instructs examiners to accept the applicant’s stated
utility unless it is utterly impossible. The expectation appears to be that, with
respect to evidence of utility, examiners search for information about utility
but do not dig into the quality of the information.
3. Enablement and Written Description
To determine if a patent is enabled, examiners must ask whether there is
sufficient evidence in the patent document to teach others in the field how to
95. Id.
96. See supra Part II.B.
97. E.g., MPEP § 2107(II) (9th ed. Rev. 10, June 2020) (describing rejections where an
examiner challenged the applicant’s asserted utility on the basis that the applicant’s statement
was “incredible in the light of the knowledge of the art”).
98. Id. § 2107.01(II).
99. Id. § 2107.02(V).
100. Id. § 2107.02 (III)(B).
101. Id.
102. Id.
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make and use the invention.103 The written description requirement calls for
a similar assessment of evidence in the patent document to ensure that the
inventor is in possession of the claimed invention.104 As discussed
previously, examiners do this by asking whether relevant information is
present in the patent document.105 This section explains that once the
examiner finds such information, she does not inquire further into its quality
unless the information is plainly unbelievable.
As an initial assessment of whether examiners dig into information quality,
I reviewed one hundred randomly selected enablement and written
description rejections106 where the examiner asserted that at least one claim
of a patent application was not enabled and/or adequately described.107 I
asked whether the examiner rejected the application on the grounds that (1)
he could not find relevant information or (2) that she found relevant
information but the information was not accurate. In all one hundred
rejections, the examiner rejected the application on the first ground: that
some piece of necessary information could not be found.108 In none of the
rejections did the examiner state that relevant information was present but
that the information was unreliable. This is threshold evidence that
examiners seek the presence of information but do not evaluate its accuracy.
Of course, if all information found by examiners were plainly correct,
examiners would not need to discuss its accuracy. However, that is not the
case. In many instances, examiners accepted evidence that was so unclear
that its accuracy could not possibly have been evaluated. For instance, an
important source of evidence in patents is visual evidence (drawings), but
this evidence can be of such poor quality that it is impossible that the
examiner could have understood the drawings. The images below, for
example, are part of the inventors’ efforts to enable and describe the
inventions. However, because the drawings are utterly incomprehensible
(the viewer is supposed to see a white arrow pointing at something visible,
103. 35 U.S.C. § 112(a).
104. Id.
105. And how to combine it with other elements. See supra Part I.B.
106. These were selected from the Office Action Research Dataset for Patents. See
generally U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., Office Action Research Dataset for Patents,
https://www.uspto.gov/learning-and-resources/electronic-data-products/office-actionresearch-dataset-patents [https://perma.cc/J9FL-JC43] (last visited Mar. 16, 2021). For more
information on this dataset, see Qiang Lu et al., USPTO Patent Prosecution Research Data:
Unlocking Office Action Traits (USPTO Econ. Working Paper No. 2017-10, 2017),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3024621 [https://perma.cc/E36V-XLQD].
107. Applications are often rejected for both lack of enablement and written description.
Lu et al., supra note 106, at 2.
108. The following example illustrates a rejection made because the examiner could not
find some piece of information relevant to enablement. A patent, filed by DaimlerChrysler,
claims an improved windshield wiper blade with “two projections extending laterally from
first end of” the bow of the blade. U.S. Patent Application No. 11/085,332 para. 7 (filed Mar.
21, 2005) (issued Sept. 21, 2006). The examiner rejected the application for lack of
enablement because “there does not appear to be any disclosure of . . . projections . . .
extending laterally . . . .” Non-Final Rejection 5 (U.S. Patent Application No. 11/085,332)
(filed Mar. 21, 2006). The examiner made the rejection because he did not find a match in the
specification for the wiper blade described in the claim.
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not a black square), the images clearly do not teach others how to make and
use the invention, nor do they prove that the inventor was in possession of
the invention.109 Yet, the examiners did not mention that the drawings do
not show what the description purports them to show.110
Figure 1: Inventor Drawings111

Examiners receiving patents with poor quality images are permitted to ask
the applicants to revise the images.112 The Manual of Patent Examining
Procedure specifically states that photographs (like those above) “must be of
sufficient quality so that all details in the photographs are reproducible in the
printed patent.”113 That examiners do not request clearer images suggests
that examiners are simply checking the boxes when it comes to enablement—
looking for a statement of enablement and written description (the patentee’s
explanation of the image) but ignoring whether the statement is supported by
evidence (the image itself). For instance, the examiner in the application
above must have accepted that “[m]etaphase chromosomes . . . are apparent
in small dividing cardiomyocytes”114 on the strength of the statement alone
because it is impossible to verify the statement by looking at the image.
Examiners not only accept evidence that is incomprehensible, but they also
accept evidence that is clearly wrong. For example, U.S. Patent No.
8,647,872 claims a method of producing embryonic stem cells and supports
this claim by providing a detailed explanation of how the stem cells can be
prepared.115 Unfortunately, the technique does not work: a paper by the
inventors in Science was retracted after a highly publicized scandal; the lead
inventor was criminally charged and admitted in court that he had forged the

109. It is not clear why the black squares are in the patent application. It is likely that they
are poor quality photocopies of other images.
110. These drawings clearly contravene the PTO’s requirement that “[d]rawings will be
accepted . . . if the drawings are readable and reproducible for publication purposes.” MPEP
§ 608.02(b)(I) (9th ed. Rev. 10, June 2020).
111. The image on the left is from U.S. Patent No. 9,574,173 col. 12 l. 7 (filed Nov. 5,
2011) (issued Feb. 21, 2017) (“[I]mmunofluorescence microscopic analysis indicates that the
immunofluorescent GFP-tagged tNSCs still persisted in the lesioned striatum . . . .”). The
images on the right are drawn from U.S. Patent Application No. 12/324,031 [27] (filed Nov.
26, 2008) (“Metaphase chromosomes (A and B: blue, PI; arrows) . . . are apparent in small
dividing cardiomyocytes . . . .”).
112. MPEP § 608.02(b)(I)–(II) (“Examiners should review the drawings for disclosure of
the claimed invention . . . . if the original drawings are unacceptable, applicant will be notified
and informed of what the objections are and that new corrected drawings are required.”).
113. 37 C.F.R. § 1.84(b)(1) (2020).
114. U.S. Patent Application No. 12/324,031 [27].
115. U.S. Patent No. 8,647,872 claim 1 (filed Dec. 9, 2011) (issued Feb. 11, 2014).
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data.116 In a strange twist, the trial also revealed that he had worked with the
Russian mafia to clone extinct mammoths.117 The patent was granted more
than ten years after the retraction made headlines in both the scientific and
popular media, suggesting that there was ample opportunity for the PTO to
learn about the retraction and reject the patent.118 The examiner was
apparently looking only for statements that described how to make and use
the stem cells—statements that were present in the application—but did not
dig into the reliability (or lack thereof) of those statements.119
II. A NEW MODEL FOR EXAMINER ERRORS
One consequence of examiners’ failure to evaluate the quality of
information used to assess patentability is errors. It is well known that patent
examiners make frequent errors during examination. There is a large body
of scholarship on these errors and there are ongoing policy efforts to reduce
and resolve these errors.120 However, existing scholarship and policy efforts
focus almost exclusively on errors in finding information, whereas this
Article predicts widespread errors in evaluating information.121 As a result,
there are likely a significant number of errors that are not recognized by
current scholarship. While the existing consensus is that patent examiners
116. Hwang Admits Faking Data, SCI. (Oct. 30, 2006, 12:00 AM),
https://www.sciencemag.org/news/2006/10/hwang-admits-faking-data
[https://perma.cc/
9WW3-VRXY].
117. Id.
118. See Andrew Pollack, Disgraced Scientist Granted U.S. Patent for Work Found to Be
Fraudulent, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 14, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/15/science/
disgraced-scientist-granted-us-patent-for-work-found-to-be-fraudulent.html
[https://perma.cc/W6MF-W7HK].
119. Id.
120. See generally ADAM B. JAFFE & JOSHUA LERNER, INNOVATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS:
HOW OUR BROKEN PATENT SYSTEM IS ENDANGERING INNOVATION AND PROGRESS, AND WHAT
TO DO ABOUT IT (2004); U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-13-465, INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY: ASSESSING FACTORS THAT AFFECT PATENT INFRINGEMENT LITIGATION COULD
HELP IMPROVE PATENT QUALITY (2013); U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-16-460,
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: PATENT OFFICE SHOULD DEFINE QUALITY, REASSESS INCENTIVES,
AND IMPROVE CLARITY (2016); John R. Allison & Ronald J. Mann, The Disputed Quality of
Software Patents, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 297 (2007); Michael D. Frakes & Melissa F.
Wasserman, Does the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office Grant Too Many Bad Patents:
Evidence from a Quasi-experiment, 67 STAN. L. REV. 613 (2015); Christi J. Guerrini, Defining
Patent Quality, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 3091 (2014); Mark A. Lemley & Bhaven Sampat,
Examining Patent Examination, 2010 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 2; R. Polk Wagner, Understanding
Patent-Quality Mechanisms, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 2135 (2009); Stephen Yelderman, Improving
Patent Quality with Applicant Incentives, 28 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 77 (2014); Gaetan de
Rassenfosse et al., Low-Quality Patents in the Eye of the Beholder: Evidence from Multiple
Examiners (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 22244, 2019),
https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w22244/w22244.pdf [https://perma.cc/
9W9M-RDYF].
121. Some scholars have written about errors caused by incorrect information, but this
literature is substantially smaller than the literature on matching errors. See, e.g., Janet Freilich
& Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Science Fiction: Fictitious Experiments in Patents, 364 SCI.
1036, 1036 (2019); Freilich, supra note 50, at 10; Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Pierson, Peer
Review, and Patent Law, 69 VAND. L. REV. 1825, 1827 (2016); Sean B. Seymore, Making
Patents Useful, 98 MINN. L. REV. 1046, 1092 (2014).
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make a substantial number of errors, the true scope of the problem is likely
considerably worse.
This part begins by showing that current scholarship has focused on
matching errors (failure to find information) and then explores the likely
prevalence and consequences of digging errors (failure to evaluate
information).
A. Matching Errors
Almost all scholarship on patent errors and poor quality patents has
focused on patents that are erroneously granted even though they are not
novel or are obvious.122 These errors are caused by failure to find matching
information. When patent examiners assess whether the invention claimed
in a patent application is novel or nonobvious, they search for prior public
disclosures matching the invention. Because the universe of prior public
disclosures is exceedingly large123 and patent examiners have little time to
process each application,124 they often overlook relevant prior art and grant
a patent on an invention even though that invention has previously been
disclosed.125
Scholars studying these erroneously granted patents have identified the
many problems that the errors cause for the patent system. Erroneously
granted patents are often used as the basis for demand letters, nuisance

122. See, e.g., John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Empirical Evidence on the Validity of
Litigated Patents, 26 AIPLA Q.J. 185, 208 (1998); Robert D. Atkinson & Daniel D. Castro,
A National Technology Agenda for the New Administration, 11 YALE J.L. & TECH. 190, 193
(2009); Joseph Farrell & Robert P. Merges, Incentives to Challenge and Defend Patents: Why
Litigation Won’t Reliably Fix Patent Office Errors and Why Administrative Patent Review
Might Help, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 943, 944–46 (2004); Roger Allan Ford, Patent Invalidity
Versus Noninfringement, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 71, 73 (2013); Michael D. Frakes & Melissa F.
Wasserman, Does Agency Funding Affect Decisionmaking: An Empirical Assessment of the
PTO’s Granting Patterns, 66 VAND. L. REV. 67, 71 (2013); Mark A. Lemley, Ignoring
Patents, 2008 MICH. ST. L. REV. 19, 20; Mark A. Lemley & Bhaven Sampat, Is the Patent
Office a Rubber Stamp?, 58 EMORY L.J. 181, 185 (2008); Doug Lichtman & Mark A. Lemley,
Rethinking Patent Law’s Presumption of Validity, 60 STAN. L. REV. 45, 47 (2007); Merges,
supra note 26, at 589; Michael J. Meurer, Controlling Opportunistic and Anti-competitive
Intellectual Property Litigation, 44 B.C. L. REV. 509, 541 (2003); Arti K. Rai, Growing Pains
in the Administrative State: The Patent Office’s Troubled Quest for Managerial Control, 157
U. PA. L. REV. 2051, 2080 (2009); David Schumann, Obviousness with Business Methods, 56
U. MIA. L. REV. 727, 764 (2002); Wagner, supra note 120, at 2139. See generally JAMES
BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOW JUDGES, BUREAUCRATS, AND
LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK (2009); DAN L. BURK & MARK A. LEMLEY, THE PATENT
CRISIS AND HOW THE COURTS CAN SOLVE IT (2008); JAFFE & LERNER, supra note 120.
123. These disclosures may be in any language and originate in any country. A disclosure
may be considered public even it is relatively obscure. For example, one Federal Circuit case
famously held that a patent application was not novel because the invention had been
previously disclosed in a PhD thesis that existed in one copy in a German library and may not
have been catalogued at the time the patent was filed. In re Hall, 781 F.2d 897, 898 (Fed. Cir.
1986).
124. Patent examiners have approximately eighteen hours for each application. Mark A.
Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1495, 1500 (2001).
125. BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 122, at 247.
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litigation, and extortion by patent trolls.126 Further, an abundance of patents,
even if invalid, clutters the patent record and complicates freedom-to-operate
searches,127 which can chill downstream research. If later innovators see that
there are hundreds of patents covering a field, they may believe that it would
be too difficult to license patents in that field and therefore pick a different
area of research, even if many of the patents are of dubious validity.128
Erroneously granted patents are a substantial and important problem in patent
law and have been the subject of many recent policy changes,129
proposals,130 and initiatives, most recently a Senate Committee on the
Judiciary hearing entitled “How Can Congress Prevent the Issuance of Poor
Quality Patents?”131
B. Digging Errors
Patent examiners can also make errors by failing to dig into the
information used to make decisions about patentability. As a threshold
matter, an examiner’s failure to inquire into the quality of evidence will only
lead to errors if the evidence reviewed by patent examiners is sometimes
incorrect. Part II.B.1 provides evidence that examiners indeed often consider
incorrect information. Part II.B.2 explores the consequences of errors that
occur when an examiner believes that information is right but the information
126. See, e.g., John R. Allison et al., Patent Quality and Settlement Among Repeat Patent
Litigants, 99 GEO. L.J. 677, 678 (2011); Colleen Chien, Startups and Patent Trolls, 17 STAN.
TECH. L. REV. 461, 466 (2014); Lauren Cohen et al., Patent Trolls: Evidence from Targeted
Firms, 65 MGMT. SCI. 5461, 5461 (2019); Mark D. Janis, Reforming Patent Validity
Litigation: The “Dubious Preponderance,” 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 923, 941 (2004).
Because patent litigation is expensive and unpredictable, recipients of demand letters may be
willing to pay a substantial sum to avoid litigation even if they believe a patent is invalid.
127. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, THE EVOLVING IP MARKETPLACE: ALIGNING PATENT
NOTICE AND REMEDIES WITH COMPETITION 116 (2011), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/
documents/reports/evolving-ip-marketplace-aligning-patent-notice-and-remediescompetition-report-federal-trade/110307patentreport.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2D3A-A4DY];
see also Ian Ayres & Gideon Parchomovsky, Tradeable Patent Rights, 60 STAN. L. REV. 863,
867 (2007); Iain M. Cockburn et al., Patent Thickets, Licensing and Innovative Performance,
19 INDUS. & CORP. CHANGE 899, 905 (2010); Alberto Galasso & Mark Schankerman, Patent
Thickets, Courts, and the Market for Innovation, 41 RAND J. ECON. 472, 472 (2010).
128. James Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, Lessons for Patent Policy from Empirical
Research on Patent Litigation, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1, 16 (2005); Michael A. Heller &
Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation?: The Anticommons in Biomedical
Research, 280 SCI. 698, 698 (1998); Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and
Royalty Stacking, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1991, 1993 (2007). But see Lemley, supra note 122, at 21
(suggesting that poor quality patents are generally ignored).
129. Reforms included in the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125
Stat. 284 (2011) (codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S.C.), were intended to
“weed out . . . low quality patents.” H.R. REP. NO. 112-98, at 38–40 (2011); Paul R. Gugliuzza,
IP Injury and the Institutions of Patent Law, 98 IOWA L. REV. 747, 748–49 (2013).
130. See, e.g., Patent Quality Improvement Act, S. 866, 113th Cong. (2013); Innovation
Act, H.R. 9, 114th Cong. (2015).
131. Promoting the Useful Arts: How Can Congress Prevent the Issuance of Poor Quality
Patents?: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Intell. Prop. of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary,
116th Cong. (2019), https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/meetings/promoting-the-useful-artshow-can-congress-prevent-the-issuance-of-poor-quality-patents
[https://perma.cc/C7P2VKY4].
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is in fact wrong. Broadly, this can lead to two types of errors: erroneous
rejection of a patent application (when a prior art disclosure of the applicant’s
invention is incorrect) or erroneous grant of a patent application (when the
applicant’s evidence about the invention is incorrect). These two types of
errors are discussed in Parts II.B.2.a and II.B.2.b, respectively.
In theory, digging errors could also occur if the examiner overdigs—i.e.,
believes that information is wrong but the information is in fact right. This
Article does not grapple with this sort of error because, given that patent
examiners rarely inquire into the quality of evidence during examination,132
it will not occur often in practice. That is, patent examiners will not generally
find that a statement is wrong if it is in fact right because they do not usually
make rejections on the basis that a statement is wrong.133 However, it is
worth noting that if patent procedures were reformed so that examiners dug
into the quality of evidence, this type of error would become more common.
1. Information Available to Examiners Is Often Incorrect
Examiner failure to dig into information quality only matters if that
information is sometimes wrong. As discussed here, there is substantial
reason to believe that much evidence reviewed by patent examiners is
incorrect.
When examiners review the utility, enablement, and written description
requirements, they use information in the patent application’s specification.
This information is provided by the applicant and is often unreliable. For
one, applicants are permitted by patent law to include fictional experiments
in applications, and examiners routinely accept these experiments as
evidence of patentability.134 For example, an examiner granted a patent
directed to a compound called Aristolochia paucinervis Pomel, at least in part
on the basis of the following fictional reports from the patent applicant:
A 67-year-old male has pancreatic cancer. Although he receives
chemotherapy and radiotherapy, six months later his therapy is
discontinued because metastases are detected. He is provided with A.
paucinervis pomel extract for three years. The patient is examined later,
and has normal renal hepatic and pulmonary test results. His tumor is
reduced in mass.
. . . A 58-year-old patient’s history, hospitalized for icterus resulting from
alcoholic hepatitis, is followed. This patient receives one-half teaspoon of
A. paucinervis pomel extract for 40 days, stops taking the extract for 10
days, and then resumes taking the extract for an additional 40 days. The
patient reports no side effects of any sort for three years following this

132. See supra Part I.C.
133. See supra Part I.D.
134. Janet Freilich, Prophetic Patents, 53 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 663, 673 (2019).
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regimen. His transaminase level is normal, and no nephrotoxicity is
observed in this patient.135

Although the examiner was aware that the studies above were fictional
(studies written in the present tense are assumed to be hypothetical),136 the
examiner required no further evidence that the compound was useful.137
My previous work has shown that 24 percent of life sciences and chemistry
patents include fictional experiments.138 While fictional experiments are not
necessarily incorrect, they are surely less likely to be correct than factual
experiments.139 If examiners routinely accept fictional experiments as
evidence of an invention’s utility and to meet the enablement and written
description requirements, some of the examiner’s decisions will be mistaken.
Even factual experiments in patent applications frequently have
characteristics suggesting that they will not be replicable, such as small
sample sizes, no statistical analysis, and failure to blind the investigators or
randomize the subjects.140 The experiment below, for example, is taken from
a patent claiming that Bag Balm (an ointment normally used on cow udders)
can, when rubbed on the head, cause hair growth141:
Subject, a hair dresser in his thirties, had tried many different products
on his scalp before he began using BAG BALM. He reports that BAG
BALM is the best product he has ever used. After about two (2) months of
daily massaging of BAG BALM into his scalp, the bald spot on top of his
head was filling-in some.142

While I do not know whether or not Bag Balm would indeed have this
effect, the replicability literature suggests that studies without controls, on
only one subject and with few details about how the application was
135. U.S. Patent No. 8,003,137 exs. 15–16 (filed May 9, 2008) (issued Aug. 23, 2011).
Doctors are skeptical that the compound would produce this effect if it were actually given to
humans (and, in addition, the compound is highly toxic). See Freilich, supra note 134, at 666.
136. See MPEP § 608.01(p) (9th ed. Rev. 10, June 2020).
137. See id. § 2164.
138. See Freilich, supra note 134, at 668 (explaining that applicants are incentivized to
include hypotheses (in the form of fictional experiments) in patents); Freilich & Larrimore
Ouellette, supra note 121, at 1036.
139. See Freilich, supra note 134, at 702.
140. See Freilich, supra note 50, at 432 (explaining that the patent system is set up to
encourage disclosure of early-stage data that is often incorrect and documenting that most
preclinical experiments in life sciences patents bear hallmarks of irreplicability); Lisa
Larrimore Ouellette, Who Reads Patents?, 35 NATURE BIOTECH. 421 fig.4 (2017) (surveying
researchers regarding the likelihood that they could replicate an invention described in a patent
in their field and finding that fewer than half believed they could); Jacob S. Sherkow, Patent
Law’s Reproducibility Paradox, 66 DUKE L.J. 845, 845 (2017) (providing several examples
of irreplicable disclosures in patents).
141. The examiner was skeptical of this example and rejected the patent for lack of utility.
In re Cortright, 165 F.3d 1353, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 1999). However, the Federal Circuit reversed,
explaining that examiners “cannot make this type of rejection, however, unless [they have]
reason to doubt the objective truth of the statements contained in” the application. Id. at 1357.
The court explained that this occurs when the patent “suggest[s] an inherently unbelievable
undertaking,” which the above experiment does not because treatments for baldness do exist.
Id. (quoting In re Brana, 51 F.3d 1560, 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1995)).
142. U.S. Patent No. 6,033,676 ex. 2 (filed Mar. 11, 1992) (issued Mar. 7, 2000).
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conducted, are often not replicable.143 As with fictional experiments, if
examiners regularly accept poor quality experiments as evidence of
patentability, examiners’ decisions as to patentability may be erroneous.
Further, if examiners never dig into the veracity of information in the
patent, there is little incentive for applicants to ensure that the information in
their applications is correct. Applicants may therefore include speculative
statements and preliminary experiments without being cautious about the
accuracy of the information. This suggests that the patent system has the
practical effect of incentivizing inclusion of inaccurate statements in patent
applications.
With respect to examination for novelty and nonobviousness, examiners
review evidence in the prior art.144 The prior art consists of the entire canon
of publicly available information—and anyone who has spent time on the
internet knows that much publicly available information is incorrect.
Further, examiners predominantly search for prior art in the patent literature,
meaning that they are searching for documents that suffer from the flaws
described above.145
2. Types of Errors
Given that much information available to examiners is incorrect and that
examiners do not dig into the quality of that information, errors will occur.
Relying on incorrect information during examination can lead both to
erroneous grants and erroneous rejections of patent applications. If the
incorrect information is in the prior art, examiners will erroneously believe
that the patent application is anticipated or obvious and will wrongly reject
the application. If the incorrect information is in the specification, examiners
will erroneously believe that the applicant has satisfied the utility,
enablement, and/or written description requirements and will wrongly grant
the patent application.
These two types of errors have fundamentally different sources and
solutions. Incorrect statements in the specification are the fault of the
applicant146 and are also known to (or should be known to) the applicant.
Incorrect statements in the prior art arise from external sources.147 This
distinction impacts the policy tools available to address the errors, as
discussed further below.
a. Erroneous Rejection
Failure to dig into the quality of information used during examination
causes erroneous rejection when a patent application that should have been
granted is denied because it is rejected as either anticipated or obvious.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.

Freilich, supra note 50, at 449.
35 U.S.C. §§ 102–103.
Chien, supra note 88, at 112–13.
Whether or not the statements are deliberately incorrect.
On occasion, prior art may be the applicant’s own previous public statements.
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However, the rejection is incorrect because the alleged disclosure in the prior
art in wrong.
The following is an example of an erroneous rejection. In 2013,
researchers at Harvard University found that a compound called betatrophin
could stimulate the growth of pancreatic β-cells, which are responsible for
insulin production, and therefore might treat or even cure diabetes.148
Unfortunately, the discovery was wrong. The authors retracted the paper and
stated that “the betatrophin hypothesis needs to be withdrawn.”149 In 2015,
a separate research team from Scripps’s California Institute of Biomedical
Research filed a patent application on a method of combining betatrophin
with antibody regions known to enhance binding activity.150 The Scripps
team claimed that these fusion proteins could be used to treat diabetes.151 In
a series of rejections beginning in June 2017 (one year after the Harvard team
had publicly acknowledged that its findings were incorrect), the examiner
rejected the Scripps team’s application because, among other reasons, it was
obvious over the Harvard team’s work.152
The examiner stated repeatedly that the Scripps team’s use of a fused
betatrophin-antibody protein to treat diabetes was obvious because the
Harvard team “teaches a composition comprising betatrophin and an
antibody that is used to treat diabetes.”153 However, the examiner’s
statement about the teaching of the Harvard study is wrong, as evidenced by
the subsequent retraction of the Harvard paper.154 Eventually, the Scripps
team amended its claims to considerably narrow the scope of its application,
losing patent scope at least in part because the examiner believed that the
Harvard team’s research was correct. It is possible that, while the Harvard
team could not use betatrophin to treat diabetes, the Scripps variation could
148. Peng Yi et al., Betatrophin: A Hormone that Controls Pancreatic β Cell Proliferation,
153 CELL 747, 747 (2013).
149. Aaron R. Cox et al., Resolving Discrepant Findings on ANGPTL8 in β-Cell
Proliferation: A Collaborative Approach to Resolving the Betatrophin Controversy, PLOS
ONE 17 (July 13, 2016), https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/
journal.pone.0159276 [https://perma.cc/84UF-XZRQ]; see also Peng Yi et al., Retraction
Notice to: Betatrophin: A Hormone that Controls Pancreatic β Cell Proliferation, 168 CELL
326, 326 (2017) (“[W]e claimed that . . . betatrophin . . . induces robust β-cell replication in
mice. . . . When we repeated our original experiments with a larger number of mice, we also
failed to observe β-cell expansion . . . . [We] have now determined conclusively that our
conclusion that . . . betatrophin causes specific β-cell replication is wrong and cannot be
supported.”).
150. U.S. Patent No. 10,259,863 cols. 1–2 (filed Jan. 10, 2014) (issued Apr. 16, 2019).
151. Id. col. 7.
152. E.g., Final Rejection 3 (U.S. Patent No. 10,259,863) (filed June 22, 2017).
153. Id.
154. Note that prior art used in an obviousness rejection does not have to be enabled (that
is, it does not have to work). MPEP § 2121.01 (9th ed. Rev. 10, June 2020). However,
obviousness rejections can be overcome by demonstrating that the prior art teaches away from
the applicant’s invention, and a retraction notice that suggests that betatrophin does not treat
diabetes certainly teaches away from using betatrophin to treat diabetes. See In re Gurley, 27
F.3d 551, 553 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (“A reference may be said to teach away when a person of
ordinary skill, upon reading the reference, would be discouraged from following the path set
out in the reference, or would be led in a direction divergent from the path that was taken by
the applicant.”).
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do so. If that is the case, the patent system may be insufficiently incentivizing
the second patent applicant in situations where the earlier patent or
application contains unreliable evidence.
Erroneous rejections of this sort could result in systematic undervaluing of
second-comers’ research in fields where the first innovator’s research was
speculative or outright wrong. This may disincentivize such research
because patents on second-comers’ research would either not be granted at
all or would be narrower than expected.155 If innovators believe that they
will not be adequately rewarded for their work, they may be deterred from
innovation even before any encounter with the PTO.156 Thus, erroneous
denials of patents may hamper incentives to innovate.
However, erroneous rejections are not overly concerning because, though
potentially serious if allowed to stand, they are readily fixable by the
applicant. In situations where an examiner has rejected an application using
prior art that contains some suspect statement, the applicant can—and has
every incentive to—dig into the evidence themselves. The applicant can
identify the problem with the prior art statement, tell the examiner that the
prior art is wrong, and ask the examiner to withdraw the rejection.157 This
was not done for the betatrophin patent discussed above (for unknown
reasons)158 but patent applicants have done this successfully in other cases.
For example, during prosecution of the patent covering an osteoporosis drug
Evista, the applicants overcame an erroneous rejection by telling the
examiner that the prior art contained errors;159 they were granted the patent
and made several billion dollars in selling the drug.160 Digging errors that
lead to erroneous rejections might be common and potentially harmful, but
they can also be quickly fixed.

155. Andres Sawicki, Better Mistakes in Patent Law, 39 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 735, 761–62
(2012); Stephen Yelderman, The Value of Accuracy in the Patent System, 84 U. CHI. L. REV.
1217, 1220 (2017).
156. Yelderman, supra note 155, at 1220.
157. 37 C.F.R. § 1.111(b) (2020).
158. Perhaps the applicants were unaware of the retraction. The scientists on the Scripps
team presumably knew that Yi and Melton’s work had failed because it was a high-profile
retraction. E.g., Damien Garde, Once-Promising Diabetes Breakthrough Isn’t After All
Scientist Says, BOS. GLOBE (Dec. 27, 2016, 7:38 PM), https://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/
2016/12/27/diabetes-breakthrough-isn-after-all-scientist-says/4u4ljoUA1WgmupriqnOkYP/
story.html [https://perma.cc/2YYK-W35S]. However, the communications between the
examiner and the applicant are generally written by attorneys, perhaps in consultation with a
technology transfer office when, as here, the applicant is based out of a university. The
scientists themselves are not always consulted, which may explain the lack of response in this
case.
159. Eli Lilly & Co. v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., 657 F. Supp. 2d 967, 988 (S.D. Ind. 2009).
The patent was originally rejected by the examiner as anticipated by an article that disclosed
use of raloxifene to treat osteoporosis. Id. The applicant submitted a declaration explaining
certain flaws in the article that rendered it unreliable, after which the examiner granted the
patent. Id.
160. Ten Blockbuster Drugs That Lost Patent in 2014, CLINICAL TRIALS ARENA (Nov. 20,
2014, 6:30 PM), https://www.clinicaltrialsarena.com/features/featureten-blockbuster-drugsthat-lost-patent-in-2014-4445799/ [https://perma.cc/XF7T-SNL5].
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b. Erroneous Grant
Errors in evaluating information quality that lead to erroneous grants are
also common and potentially harmful but, unlike erroneous rejections, are
difficult to fix. An erroneous grant due to a digging mistake occurs when an
examiner grants a patent that is in fact not useful, not enabled, or not
adequately described. In this type of error, an examiner will find that the
patent application contains statements of utility, teachings of how to make
and use the invention, and explanations showing possession, but these
statements are not correct—which will not be discovered by the examiner
because the examiner did not evaluate the reliability of the evidence.
Unlike erroneous rejections, this type of error is unlikely to be fixed during
prosecution. There are two parties involved in patent prosecution: the
examiner and the applicant. The examiner will not fix these digging errors
because the examiner (having already made the error) evidently holds
erroneous beliefs about the evidence under examination. The applicant will
not fix the error because there is no incentive for applicants to correct
mistakes that cause their applications to be granted.
These mistakes are harmful. An erroneously granted patent gives its
owner the exclusive right to make and use the invention where such a right
is not warranted.161 These patents disincentivize inventors other than the
patentee from working in the field covered by the patent because third parties
must obtain a license from the patentee. When a patent is erroneously
granted due to a digging error—when the patentee does not actually know
how to make and use the invention or is unaware of its utility—patent grant
precludes others from discovering the invention’s use or how it works. Since
the inventor does not know how to make the invention and others are blocked
from finding out, this has the practical effect of preventing anyone from
making or using the invention. If Jules Verne had been granted a patent on
a submarine162 (which he imagined in his writing but could not actually
make), he could have used the patent to block others who were trying to truly
develop the technology and we might not have submarines. Because
Theranos was granted dozens of patents on diagnostic technology, these
patents can be asserted against other innovators—even though Theranos
could not make its technology work and other innovators appear to have
working technology.
Patents granted erroneously due to digging errors are a particular problem
because they are often broad in scope and may cover—and block others from
discovering—downstream uses that the patentee never thought of.163 The
impact of erroneously granted patents is particularly acute in the United
States because there are few exceptions to patent infringement.164 There are
161. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a).
162. See generally JULES VERNE, TWENTY THOUSAND LEAGUES UNDER THE SEA (Chicago,
Butler Bros. 1887).
163. See Freilich, supra note 134, at 688.
164. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (allowing patent owners to prevent others from making, using,
selling, offering for sale, or importing their inventions).
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no exceptions for independent invention,165 research that improves on a
technology,166 socially desirable “fair use,”167 or use of a technology for
public health or to save a life.168 Thus, the consequences of erroneous patent
grants are severe.
Finally, erroneous grants create harm because they publicize documents
with incorrect information. One purpose of patents is to publicly disclose
information about new technologies that can then be used by others to build
on and further develop the science.169 However, if the information in patents
is wrong, the disclosure function of patents works poorly.170
C. Benefits of the Status Quo
Examiner failure to dig into the quality of evidence during examination
creates serious costs in the form of erroneously granted patents. However,
the current system—where examiners match but do not dig—has certain
advantages.
The first benefit of the status quo is the cost of examination. Digging takes
time and resources and is consequently expensive. Asking examiners to
verify evidence to prevent errors would be costly, and the cost may outweigh
the expense of the errors themselves.171 Thus, a system where examiners

165. Several scholars have argued that there should be such an exception. See, e.g., Mark
A. Lemley, Should Patent Infringement Require Proof of Copying?, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1525,
1526 (2007); Samson Vermont, Independent Invention as a Defense to Patent Infringement,
105 MICH. L. REV. 475, 476 (2006).
166. Although, under the reverse doctrine of equivalents, a device that literally falls within
the claims of a patent may not infringe if it “has so far changed the principle of the device that
the claims of the patent, literally construed, have ceased to represent” the device.
Westinghouse v. Boyden Power Brake Co., 170 U.S. 537, 568 (1898). However, the reverse
doctrine of equivalents is functionally dead, as the Federal Circuit has never used it and has
called the doctrine an “anachronistic exception, long mentioned but rarely applied.” Tate
Access Floors v. Interface Architectural Res., Inc., 279 F.3d 1357, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (“Not
once has this court affirmed a decision finding noninfringement based on the reverse doctrine
of equivalents.”).
167. Such an exception exists for copyrights. See 17 U.S.C. § 107. The statute excludes
from infringement “fair use” of a copyrighted work, such as use for “criticism, comment, news
reporting, teaching . . . scholarship, or research” and provides four factors to guide analysis of
whether an action constitutes fair use. Id. Scholars have argued that there should be a fair use
doctrine in patent. See Maureen A. O’Rourke, Toward a Doctrine of Fair Use in Patent Law,
100 COLUM. L. REV. 1177, 1178 (2000).
168. Under the Bayh-Dole Act, Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3015 (1980) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of the U.S.C.), the government has “march-in rights” to patents
funded by federal agencies and can require the patentee to grant a license to the patented
technology if “action is necessary to alleviate health or safety needs.” 35 U.S.C. § 203(a)(2).
However, these rights are somewhat illusory as they have never been used.
169. See, e.g., Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kan. City, 383 U.S. 1, 6 (1966) (“[T]hings
which add to the sum of useful knowledge are inherent requisites in a patent system which by
constitutional command must ‘promote the Progress of . . . useful Arts.’” (alteration in
original) (quoting U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 8)).
170. See, e.g., W. Nicholson Price II, Regulating Secrecy, 91 WASH. L. REV. 1769, 1805
(2016) (“[D]isclosure is undoubtedly a key component of cumulative innovation . . . .”).
171. Compare Lemley, supra note 124, at 1495, with Michael Frakes & Melissa
Wasserman, Irrational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 72 VAND. L. REV. 975, 976 (2019).
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search for, but do not evaluate the quality of evidence, is substantially
cheaper and faster than the alternative.
A second benefit of a system where examiners only conduct a matching
analysis is the consistency and standardizability of examination. There are
thousands of patent examiners.172 Ideally, the outcome of prosecution should
not depend on the individual examiner to which the patent is assigned.173
Thus, each examiner should follow a set of processes that can be standardized
across the PTO and that would result in similar outcomes if followed by a
different examiner. This goal is easier to achieve for matching than for
digging because matching is more objective. If one were to search a database
for a particular technology and get a specific result, someone else searching
in the same database for the same technology should be able to obtain similar
findings.174 The precise outcome will of course differ based on choices such
as search terms but, on the whole, the process ought to be at least somewhat
replicable.
By contrast, digging into the veracity of evidence is considerably harder to
standardize. How would examiners know when to accept a statement as true
or when to dig further? If digging further, what sources should be consulted?
When is a source sufficiently reliable to corroborate a statement? Protocols
can certainly be developed to standardize this process, but there is more
subjective judgment involved for digging than for matching, so consistency
in digging is harder to achieve.
For similar reasons, it is easier to document, explain, and challenge
matching decisions than digging decisions. Examiners record search
strategies175 and then write a letter to the applicant stating any matches found
between the application’s claims and the prior art.176 For example, in a
sample patent application claiming “extruding a chlorinated polymer” at an
angle of 30 degrees, the examiner wrote that a prior art reference by Berridge
taught an extruding chlorinated polymer and a prior art reference by McGee
taught extrusions of 25–35 degrees.177 Thus, it is well documented that each
172. Frakes & Wasserman, supra note 171, at 613.
173. Although there is substantial evidence that it does. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley &
Bhaven Sampat, Examiner Characteristics and Patent Office Outcomes, 94 REV. ECON. &
STAT. 817, 819 (2012); Iain Cockburn et al., Are All Patent Examiners Equal?: The Impact
of Examiner Characteristics, 24–25 (Nat’l Bureau Econ. Rsch. Working Paper No. 8980,
2002),
https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w8980/w8980.pdf
[https://
perma.cc/C8QS-CVLT].
174. Though, efforts to standardize have created challenges for the searching process. For
example, the PTO has discouraged examiners from taking “[o]fficial notice unsupported by
documentary evidence,” which has prevented examiners from making rejections based on
common sense (which is not always found in the literature). MPEP § 2144.03 (9th ed. Rev.
10, June 2020); see also Jorge L. Contreras, Common Knowledge and Non-patent Literature
in the Internet Age, BERKELEY TECH. L.J. ONLINE (Mar. 12, 2016),
https://btlj.org/2016/03/common-knowledge-and-non-patent-literature-in-the-internet-age-2/
[https://perma.cc/B7X3-DS9W].
175. A full set of the examiner’s searches can be found in the prosecution history of each
application. MPEP § 719.05.
176. This occurs in a document called an “Office Action.” MPEP § 2262.
177. Id.
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element of the application’s claim ((1) extruding chlorinated polymers, (2) at
30 degrees) is present in the prior art. The applicant can see those reasons,
review the prior art for herself, and respond to the examiner’s rejection if she
believes that the match is incorrect. Conversely, because digging is more
subjective, examiner decisions about the reliability of evidence would be
harder to explain and consequently harder to challenge.
Finally, in certain circumstances, it is appropriate to put the burden of
digging on the applicant. In the context of erroneous rejections, the current
system correctly places the burden of digging on the applicant. Erroneous
rejections occur when the examiner rejects an application over prior art, but
there is some flaw in the prior art such that it does not actually anticipate or
render obvious the invention.178 In the case of an erroneous rejection, the
applicant has an opportunity to reply and argue against the rejection by
presenting evidence to the examiner that the rejection was wrong and should
be withdrawn.179 Between the examiner and the applicant, the applicant is
better positioned to uncover flaws in the prior art because the applicant is
more likely to be an expert in the field.180 Thus, the current system sensibly
puts the burden of digging on the applicant.
III. FURTHER IMPLICATIONS AND REFORM
Understanding patent examination as a process dedicated to finding, but
not evaluating, information suggests a new category of examiner errors. It
also provides further insight into patent theory and avenues for reform. Part
III explores additional implications and presents several specific policy
recommendations. Part III.A explains that current methods of fixing errors
in the patent system will not solve digging errors because, unlike matching
errors, digging errors are characterized by asymmetric access to information.
This is followed by proposals for information-forcing mechanisms to remedy
the asymmetry and fix digging errors. Part III.B frames prosecution and
litigation as procedures that do fundamentally different things: matching
occurs during prosecution; digging during litigation. It therefore follows that
litigation should not wholesale copy doctrines of patentability from
prosecution—and several doctrines are identified as ripe for change. Part
III.C argues that, since patent examination is a series of matching steps, it is
particularly amenable to automation.

178. See supra Part II.C.1.
179. 37 C.F.R. § 1.111 (2020) (“If the Office action . . . is adverse in any respect, the
applicant or patent owner . . . must reply and request reconsideration . . . .”).
180. The examiner has a general background in the field, but the applicant works in the
specific field of the invention. See Become a Patent Examiner, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF.
https://www.uspto.gov/jobs/become-patent-examiner [https://perma.cc/6PL4-MBDX] (last
visited Mar. 16, 2021) (click “Qualifications” under “I’m interested! Tell me more . . . ”)
(“Minimum of a bachelor’s degree in engineering or science.”).
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A. Fixing Errors
Part II argued that erroneous grants of patents due to digging errors are
common and harmful. This section explores how these errors can be
addressed. At the outset, any type of error—matching or digging—can be
corrected in litigation, where a court can review the examiner’s grant of the
patent and can find the patent invalid.181 However, litigation is expensive.
Further, a challenger trying to prove that a patent is invalid is at an initial
disadvantage in litigation because granted patents are presumed to be
valid.182 Downstream researchers may therefore choose to avoid litigation
and either pay for a license based on an erroneously granted patent or simply
shift their research to a different area.183 So-called “patent trolls” leverage
the difficulty of litigation to extract rents from baseless patent claims.184
Efforts at fixing erroneously granted patents have therefore focused on
prevention and on quick fixes that avoid the need for lengthy and expensive
litigation.185 Because there is a large existing scholarship on errors during
examination, there is also an extensive array of policy proposals to prevent
or fix such errors, some of which have been enacted by Congress.186
However, like the existing scholarship on examination errors, existing policy
proposals relating to fixing those errors are focused predominantly on
matching errors—examiner failure to find relevant information.187 But there
is a critical difference between matching errors and digging errors: matching
errors are equally visible to both the applicant and to others, such as the
examiner and the public; digging errors are often not. Unfortunately, most
existing mechanisms to address erroneously granted patents require the error
to be visible to either the examiner or to third parties and therefore, will not
be as effective at finding or fixing digging errors.
The following section begins by explaining that, because digging errors—
unlike matching errors—are characterized by information asymmetry,
existing policy mechanisms will not be effective. I then propose a new set
of policies to address the particular problems caused by failure to dig into
information quality.
1. Information Asymmetry
When an inventor writes a statement in a patent application, such as
“widgets inhibit the growth of cancer cells,” the applicant knows how much
and what type of evidence supports that statement. The public does not, nor
do patent examiners. The statement might be backed up by extensive clinical
181. 35 U.S.C. § 282(b)(1).
182. Id. § 282(a).
183. See, e.g., Lichtman & Lemley, supra note 122, at 48.
184. E.g., BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 122, at 3; John M. Golden, “Patent Trolls” and
Patent Remedies, 85 TEX. L. REV. 2111, 2128 (2007).
185. See, e.g., Paul R. Gugliuzza, Quick Decisions in Patent Cases, 106 GEO. L.J. 619, 619
(2018).
186. Most notably, the creation of inter partes review proceedings. 35 U.S.C. § 311.
187. See infra notes 192–97 and accompanying text.
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trials and be highly reliable, or it might be entirely speculative and founded
simply on conjecture. The applicant does not need to disclose how much or
what type of evidence supports statements in the patent application, so
examiners and the public have no easy way to flag statements that are likely
to be wrong.
This is well illustrated by the long fraud perpetuated by Theranos. The
company claimed that it was able to make diagnoses based on small drops of
blood.188 The public had no access to the data underlying that claim and was
therefore unable, at least for a time, to suspect that Theranos’s technology
did not work.189
Further, third parties cannot simply test the applicant’s statement, because
doing so would likely be patent infringement.190 Further, there are a host of
other practical difficulties involved in investigating the veracity of a claim in
a patent, including the cost of replication trials, the ability to repeat an
experiment if very few details are given about experimental conditions, and,
for life sciences patents, ethical concerns.191 It is therefore often not possible
for third parties to obtain information about the quality of a statement in a
patent application.
While the process of digging into information quality is characterized by
asymmetrical access to information, the process of matching information is
equally available to the applicant, the examiner, and the public. For example,
if a patent application claims widgets, an examiner will search the prior art
for information on widgets. Perhaps the examiner will overlook a piece of
matching information in the prior art and erroneously grant the patent. The
prior art is, by definition, public, so third parties can conduct their own
searches and find the overlooked information.192 Applicants, examiners, and
third parties all have access to the same prior art.193
Current policy mechanisms, built with matching errors in mind, rely on the
ability of examiners or third parties to find errors. Because this is possible
188. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, supra note 5.
189. Id.
190. Using a patented invention is infringement. 35 U.S.C. § 271. However, some dicta
suggests that there may be an exception for testing the patented invention. Whittemore v.
Cutter, 29 F. Cas 1120, 1121 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813) (No. 17,600) (“[I]t could never have been
the intention of the legislature to punish a man, who constructed [a patented] machine . . . for
the purpose of ascertaining the sufficiency of the machine to produce its described effects.”).
This passage is quoted as the origin of the experimental use doctrine, which has been
essentially eliminated in recent years. See, e.g., Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351 (Fed.
Cir. 2002); Embrex, Inc. v. Serv. Eng’g Corp., 216 F.3d 1343, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
191. For example, if a patentee claims that widgets treat cancer but a third party is skeptical
that this is true, it is not ethical to run a clinical trial testing whether widgets in fact treat cancer.
192. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1) (listing disclosures that qualify as prior art). On rare
occasions, prior art will not be public for a time (specifically patent applications that have not
yet been published, id. § 102(a)(2)), but these disclosures will become public after a short
period. Id. § 122(b). Patent specifications, where examiners search for information relating to
utility, enablement, and written description, are also public with minor exceptions for national
security purposes. Id. § 181.
193. Matching might be somewhat easier for the applicants, because they are presumably
familiar with the literature in their fields of study, but third parties can, with time and effort,
catch up.
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for matching errors but considerably harder for digging errors, these
mechanisms may not work in the context of digging errors. This section
discusses two popular approaches for addressing errors.
One widespread proposal for alleviating examination errors is to give
patent examiners more time to review each application.194 The intuition is
that many mistakes occur because examiners are rushed; therefore, if
examiners could devote additional effort to reviewing applications, they
would make fewer mistakes. This is likely true for matching errors—the
universe of prior art is exceedingly large and examiners currently have
approximately twenty hours to handle all aspects of examination for each
application.195 Empirical work has shown that increasing the amount of time
available to examiners reduces the number of errors.196 But increasing the
amount of time available to examiners will not substantially reduce the
number of digging errors.197 The problem with digging is not that examiners
lack time, it is that they lack information. Thus, this proposed mechanism
addresses only matching errors.
A second mechanism to address examiner errors is inter partes review
(IPR) proceedings. IPR proceedings allow third parties, even those who
would not have standing to challenge a patent in court, to petition the PTO to
review the patent.198 IPR proceedings are required to finish on a timeline
much shorter than that of a court case and are considerably cheaper, in part
because they permit only limited discovery.199 The proceedings were
authorized by Congress as part of the 2011 Leahy-Smith America Invents
Act200 in recognition of the need for cheaper, faster, and more available
patent challenges.201 IPR proceedings are designed to catch examiner errors
and remove those patents without the need for litigation.
However, IPR proceedings will only fix matching errors. At present, IPR
proceedings can only be brought on the grounds that a granted patent is not
novel or is obvious.202 Granted patents that are in fact not novel or are
194. Michael D. Frakes & Melissa F. Wasserman, Is the Time Allocated to Review Patent
Applications Inducing Examiners to Grant Invalid Patents?: Evidence from Micro-level
Application Data, 99 REV. ECON. & STAT. 550, 560 (2017); Sean B. Seymore, The
Presumption of Patentability, 97 MINN. L. REV. 990, 995 (2013); John R. Thomas, Collusion
and Collective Action in the Patent System: A Proposal for Patent Bounties, 2001 U. ILL. L.
REV. 305, 314.
195. Frakes & Wasserman, supra note 194, at 550.
196. Id.
197. Of course, if examiners had unlimited time to review patent applications, they could
attempt to replicate studies and test the veracity of statements in patent applications. But the
time required would be considerable.
198. 35 U.S.C. § 311(a).
199. COLIN G. SANDERCOCK & TODD R. SAMELMAN, PERKINS COIE LLP, AIPLA 2012
ANNUAL MEETING:
DISCOVERY PROCEDURES UNDER THE AIA 2 (2012),
https://www.perkinscoie.com/images/content/2/7/v2/27610/12-10-sandercock-samelmandiscoveryprocedures.pdf [https://perma.cc/SV54-RU9Q].
200. Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) (codified in scattered sections of the U.S.C.).
201. Stephen Yelderman, Prior Art in Inter Partes Review, 104 IOWA L. REV. 2705, 2706
(2019).
202. 35 U.S.C. § 311(b). The proceedings are also restricted to prior art patents or printed
publications. Id.
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obvious are the result of matching errors where the examiner failed to find
relevant prior art. Thus, digging errors cannot be addressed through IPR
proceedings as they are currently conceived. However, even if the
proceedings were reformed to allow challenges on the grounds that the
patented invention is not useful, enabled, or adequately described (grounds
that result from digging errors), it would be difficult for the proceedings to
address these errors effectively because the proceedings rely on the public to
identify errors and bring a challenge but do not have the same discovery
mechanisms as litigation.203
2. Information-Forcing Mechanisms
The solution, put broadly, is to imbue the patent system with informationforcing mechanisms that require or incentivize patentees to provide
additional information about the quality of evidence supporting statements in
the patent specification. This effectively outsources the task of digging into
information quality from examiners to applicants. It does not perfectly
substitute for a process by which examiners independently verify information
in the patent, but it can approximate some features of that process.
Information-forcing mechanisms can improve the patent system during
prosecution or after patent grant. During prosecution, additional information
can improve examiners’ ability to dig into the reliability of applicants’
statements in the specification. If provided after patent grant, additional
information can help third parties identify erroneously granted patents. The
sections below set out several potential information-forcing mechanisms, but
these are not exclusive: the principle can be applied in many ways.
a. During Examination
A key element of the information-forcing mechanisms set out below is that
they put the burden on the applicant to provide additional support for
statements in the prosecution, rather than asking examiners to do further
digging into the quality of evidence. This is because examiners are not well
positioned for this task. First, applicants have more access to information
about the reliability of evidence than examiners. Second, it would be
enormously expensive and time-consuming204 to ask examiners to assess the
reliability of statements in applications or prior art, particularly because
doing so might require building lab facilities and replicating experiments that
cost many thousands of dollars. Moreover, examiners do not have the
expertise. Examiners have at least a bachelor’s degree in the subject that they

203. Note that postgrant review does allow arguments about utility, enablement, and
written description. Id. § 321(b). However, these proceedings are rarely used. Colleen Chien
et al., Inter Partes Review and the Design of Post-grant Patent Review, 33 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 817, 827 (2018).
204. Examiners are already short on time, which is thought to underlie the large number of
patents granted despite being obvious or anticipated. E.g., Frakes & Wasserman, supra note
194, at 551.
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are examining,205 but this does not mean that an examiner would have the
ability to conduct replication experiments or even to carefully dig into data
and results as a peer reviewer would do.206 Finally, the cost-benefit analysis
is unclear: the expense of carefully digging into data might be higher than
the expense of patent errors.207
Instead of requiring examiners to further dig into the quality of evidence
in patent applications, the system should ask applicants to provide additional
support for their statements. This takes advantage of applicants’ superior
knowledge. Examiners would then take the additional evidence and match it
to statements in the specification. By using matching to capture some of the
benefits of digging, these policy reforms fit better with examiners’ expertise
and capability and are less expensive and time-consuming.
One approach would require applicants to submit corroborating evidence
for statements made in the patent specification. Examiners would then match
statements in the patent application to the additional evidence. If statements
in the application are corroborated by the additional evidence, the statements
are more likely to be correct. For example, for each step required to make a
product, the applicant could submit either documentation from the prior art
on how that step was conducted or, if the step was novel, lab notebooks
documenting performance of the step and the outcome.208 Alternatively, the
examiner could ask for a physical model of the invention and ensure that each
element claimed by the patent matched an element in the physical model.209
Where images in the patent are used to corroborate applicant claims,
examiners should require that applicants furnish new drawings if the
submitted drawings are unreadable.210 For inventions not physically reduced
to practice, examiners could ask for extensive documentation explaining why
each novel step would be expected to work.211
This would be very roughly akin to the practice of footnoting a law review
article—the article makes a novel argument but footnotes each step needed
to support the argument so that the reader can be confident that the novel
portion of the article is plausible. Law review editors, like patent examiners,
cannot fully verify the reliability of each statement in a law review article.
205. U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., supra note 180.
206. Ronald J. Mann, The Idiosyncrasy of Patent Examiners: Effects of Experience and
Attrition, 92 TEX. L. REV. 2149, 2163 (2014).
207. See supra Part II.C.
208. This would work only for inventions physically reduced to practice.
209. Under current PTO practice, examiners only request physical models to prove
operability for patents on perpetual motion machines (presumably because the applicant would
not be able to create a physical model). MPEP § 608.03 (9th ed. Rev. 10, June 2020) (“With
the exception of cases involving perpetual motion, a model is not ordinarily required by the
Office . . . .”). However, the PTO has the power to make these requests. 35 U.S.C. § 114
(“The Director may require the applicant to furnish a model of convenient size to exhibit
advantageously the several parts of his invention.”). Historically, the PTO did require physical
models of inventions when a patent application was filed. Christopher A. Cotropia,
Physicalism and Patent Theory, 69 VAND. L. REV. 1543, 1547 (2016).
210. See supra Part III.C.3.a.
211. At present, applicants may be reluctant to provide this sort of evidence lest it make
the invention appear obvious.
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But they can ensure (via footnotes) that each building block of a novel
argument matches a prior published statement.
Once the applicant has supplied such evidence, the examiner could ensure
that each step in the patent was corroborated by additional evidence. To be
sure, these changes would be complex and add additional work for the
applicant and the examiner. However, the applicant ought to be in possession
of much of the corroborating evidence anyway, so disclosing it to the PTO
might not add a substantial burden for the applicant. Although there would
be an additional burden on the examiner, it would be a smaller burden than
requiring examiners to conduct their own analyses into the reliability of the
evidence provided by the applicant.
The PTO could also encourage examiners to take certain actions toward
digging into information quality. Examiners could search for third-party
opinions about a particular technology—essentially the same matching steps
that are taken in the context of novelty and nonobviousness—but look
forward from the application date, rather than backwards. This is not done
at present because examiners search for evidence that the applicant’s
invention existed before the application was filed and therefore truncate their
searches at the date of the patent application.212 However, because
examiners are examining applications at least a year after the application has
been filed213 (and often five or ten years later, in the case of patent
families),214 other scientists will sometimes have commented on a
technology in a filed application and these comments may make clear to
examiners that statements in the patent are incorrect.215
For example, in 2017, Dr. Piero Anversa filed patent applications on
various inventions involving cardiac stem cells.216 In 2019, an examiner
searched for prior art, truncating his search at the application’s 2009 priority
date.217 Had the examiner searched forward from the priority date, he would
have discovered that Piero Anversa’s research is one of the most notorious
examples of scientific fraud and that the invention claimed in the patent
application—cardiac stem cells—apparently does not exist.218 The examiner
212. More specifically, the priority date. 35 U.S.C. § 120; 37 C.F.R. § 1.78 (2020).
213. Patents Pendency Data December 2020, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF.,
https://www.uspto.gov/dashboard/patents/pendency.html [https://perma.cc/4JRR-4P59] (last
visited Mar. 16, 2021).
214. Mark A. Lemley & Kimberly A. Moore, Ending Abuse of Patent Continuations, 84
B.U. L. REV. 63, 65 (2004) (describing patents that spent decades in prosecution).
215. For example, in the patent on stem cells cited in note 115, supra, the journal Science
had published an article stating that relevant data had been faked eight years before the patent
was granted. Supra note 116. If the application is novel, these third-party comments will occur
after the application is filed, not before (or at least not more than a year before the priority
date). 35 U.S.C. § 102.
216. U.S. Patent Application No. 15/804,339 (filed Nov. 6, 2017).
217. Examiner’s Search Strategy and Results (U.S. Patent Application No. 15/804,339)
(filed June 4, 2019).
218. Gina Kolata, He Promised to Restore Damaged Hearts. Harvard Says His Lab
Fabricated Research, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 29, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/29/
health/dr-piero-anversa-harvard-retraction.html [https://perma.cc/HL58-AMY6] (citing over
thirty research articles that were retracted because of falsified or fabricated data, a ten-million-
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did not make a rejection on the grounds that the invention did not work but,219
had he searched forward from the priority date, he would certainly have
discovered evidence justifying such a rejection. Thus, the examiner could
have used a matching technique (searching for information in documents
published after the patent’s filing date) to analyze the quality of evidence in
the patent and avoid an error.
To avoid undue burden on both applicant and examiner, these policies
could be targeted to patent applications that are particularly susceptible to
errors in information quality. Jorge Contreras has suggested that the PTO
could keep a list of names appearing on retracted papers, in criminal
proceedings related to fraud, and involved in securities investigations.220
Should these individuals be named as inventors on patent applications, the
PTO could apply more scrutiny. Contreras further suggests heightened
scrutiny of technologies in categories that are particularly suspect, which was
done historically by a now defunct PTO program.221
The suggestions above of methods to use matching techniques to better
analyze evidence are merely illustrative. There are many other possible ways
to adapt matching for evidentiary analysis. Cataloguing each is beyond the
scope of this Article. Rather, this Article seeks to establish a template for
examination reform: digging into evidence is difficult for examiners, but
some of the goals of such scrutiny can be approximated using information
provided by applicants—thus taking advantage of applicants’ superior access
to information.
b. Beyond the Examiner
The goal of encouraging information disclosures can be applied beyond
the applicant and examiner. In some circumstances, other parties would be
both motivated to elicit and capable of eliciting information about the quality
and veracity of evidence in patent applications.
First, the duty of disclosure could be leveraged to encourage lawyers,
assignees, and technology transfer offices (TTO) to evaluate the quality of
evidence in filed patent applications. Everyone associated with patent
filing—inventors, attorneys, assignees, TTOs—owes the PTO duties of
disclosure, candor, and good faith.222 Attorneys, assignees, and TTOs could
be a powerful check on applicants tempted to include inaccurate or
dollar settlement between Anversa’s employer and the U.S. Department of Justice over
charges of fraudulently obtaining research funding, and multiple quotes from respected
scientists explaining that Anversa’s work is wrong).
219. The examiner issued only one rejection, which did not discuss the invention’s
operability. See Non-Final Rejection 3–4 (U.S. Patent Application No. 15/804,339) (filed June
4, 2019).
220. See Jorge L. Contreras, Patent Fakes: How Fraudulent Inventions Threaten Public
Health, Innovation, and the Economy, BILL OF HEALTH (July 1, 2020),
https://blog.petrieflom.law.harvard.edu/2020/07/01/patent-fakes-fraud-inventions-covid/
[https://perma.cc/LT8L-JNAC].
221. Id.
222. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.56 (2020).
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speculative statements in applications. For example, one recent Theranos
patent claiming “[a] method of detecting an analyte in a . . . blood sample
having a volume of less than about 500 μL”223 (the technology widely
believed to be fraudulent) was filed by attorneys at a large, very reputable
intellectual property boutique.224 The lawyers at the firm should have
knownparticularly by 2018, when the patent was grantedthat statements
coming from their client, Theranos, were suspect. The firm should have
carefully reviewed the contents of the patents and asked for additional
evidence. A statement from the PTO emphasizing that the duty of disclosure
applies in this sort of situation could be an effective incentive for attorneys
and others involved in the filing process to police information quality.
Another alternative would be to apply a higher standard of scrutiny to
patent applications assigned to institutions who had previously failed to
report known incorrect information to an examiner. For example, a major
research university filed a patent application with a diagram that had been
retracted from a paper on the same topic several years prior (as seen in Figure
1, below); applying a higher standard of scrutiny to subsequent applications
from that university would incentivize the institution to carefully review its
applications to avoid such accidental inclusion.
Figure 2: Retracted Image and Later Reproduction

Figure 3(a) (partial)

223. U.S. Patent No. 10,156,579 col. 24 (filed Feb. 26, 2016) (issued Dec. 18, 2018).
224. See id. at [74].
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The left-hand image is a partial reproduction of figure 3(a) from a paper
by Zhang et al., retracted in 2016.225 The retraction notice specifically
retracts figure 3(a), stating that the
authors wish to note the following: “It has come to our attention that there
were significant errors in the data analysis that formed the basis of Figs. 2
and 3 of this paper, and we are no longer confident in the results presented
or the conclusions made from the data represented in those figures . . . .”226

The right-hand image is a reproduction of figure 15A from a patent filed
by Tufts University (with the inventors listed as Zhang’s coauthors) in 2017,
which includes the retracted data.227
In addition, patent doctrine should be clarified to encourage third parties
to test and replicate statements from the patent—providing an opportunity
for others to uncover errors. A patent grant gives the patentee the right to
exclude others from making and using the patented invention.228 If a third
party wanted to conduct an experiment to verify whether the information in
the patent was correct, doing so would be patent infringement, and the
patentee could seek an injunction or damages.229 Although there is an
experimental use exception for patent infringement, it is extremely narrow
and it is not clear whether it would apply in this situation.230 This may
prevent third parties who want to investigate the veracity of a patent’s
statements from doing so.
Further, it impedes scrutiny by patent applicants seeking to overcome an
examiner’s rejection. For example, if an examiner rejects an application for
lack of novelty, the applicant may wish to conduct tests to show that the prior
art was not enabled and, therefore, not a valid basis for the rejection.231
However, if the prior art is an in-force patent, the rejected applicant cannot
conduct such experiments because doing so would be patent infringement. It
would be helpful to have a doctrine that clearly stated that using a patented
technology for purposes of determining whether a statement in the patent was
correct would not constitute patent infringement.
B. Reevaluating the Prosecution-Litigation Interface
Errors are not the only implication of the matching-digging dichotomy.
The framework also helps understand differences in prosecution and
litigation, which in turn dictates certain policy changes. A key difference
between prosecution and litigation is that examiners in prosecution do not—
and often cannot—dig into the quality of evidence used to evaluate

225. Jeney Zhang et al., Retraction, Stabilization of Vaccines and Antibiotics in Silk and
Eliminating the Cold Chain, 113 PNAS 11,981 (2016).
226. Id.
227. U.S. Patent Application No. 15/858,239 (filed Dec. 29, 2017).
228. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a).
229. See id.
230. See Freilich, supra note 50, at 473.
231. See supra Part II.C.
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patentability. In litigation, both matching and digging occur.232 This
difference arises because prosecution is an ex parte proceeding with only one
party (the patent applicant), whereas litigation is an adversarial inter partes
proceeding with parties on both sides and extensive discovery proceedings.
The party opposing the patent in litigation has the motivation and resources
to bring arguments that would not be possible for the patent examiner.233 In
litigation, parties can and do challenge the veracity of evidence brought by
the other side. This section explores how patent theory and policy should be
reconceptualized and reformed to account for this difference.
1. Examination as Quasi-registration
The PTO examination process is—as the name suggests—considered an
examination procedure, as opposed to a registration procedure.234 In an
examination procedure, patents are reviewed in depth by examiners with
expertise in the field of the invention, an expensive and time consuming
process that has the advantage of winnowing the pool of submitted
applications and yielding a high-quality set of granted patents, reducing the
need for later litigation.235 In a registration process, an administrative office
ensures all components needed for patentability are present but does not
inspect the validity of those components at length. Registration has the
advantages of being cheap, quick, and easy.236 The public saves money by
avoiding an expansive PTO staff and applicants save time, money, and effort
by avoiding extended back-and-forth proceedings with the examiner. If an
invalid patent were registered, it could be challenged in litigation.
Registration shifts the cost of careful analysis from the prosecution stage to
the litigation stage.
If patent grant is conceptualized as an event that occurs after an
examination process, litigation plays a relatively smaller role in governing
patent quality. However, the matching-digging dichotomy suggests a
232. This is because the veracity and reliability of a piece of evidence are often challenged
by the opposing party.
233. An examiner typically has fewer than twenty hours to review each patent. Michael J.
Meurer, Patent Examination Priorities, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 675, 677 (2009).
234. In its early years, the patent system functioned as a registration process. See Edward
C. Walterscheid, The Early Evolution of the United States Patent Law: Antecedents (pt. 1),
76 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 697, 709 (1994). The idea of moving back to a
registration system is often discussed in the scholarly literature. See, e.g., Roger Allan Ford,
The Patent Spiral, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 827, 831 (2016); F. Scott Kieff, The Case for Registering
Patents and the Law and Economics of Present Patent-Obtaining Rules, 45 B.C. L. REV. 55,
59 (2003); Lemley, supra note 124, at 1531; Wagner, supra note 120, at 2162–63. But see
Greg Reilly, The Complicated Relationship of Patent Examination and Invalidation, 69 AM.
U. L. REV. 1095, 1095 (2020) (arguing that the patent system presently functions as a partial
registration system).
235. The current patent system is assumed to operate under an examination system. The
Patent Act of 1952, 35 U.S.C. §§ 1–293, charges the PTO to “cause an examination to be made
of the [patent] application.” Id. § 131. The statute explains that such examination should
determine whether “the applicant is entitled to a patent under the law.” Id. The Act further
lists requirements for patentability that must be examined. Id. §§ 101–103, 112.
236. See Merges, supra note 26, at 594–95.
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different framing: with respect to many aspects of patent prosecution, our
current system is a quasi-registration process. Examiners do not dig into or
independently assess the veracity of applicants’ statements and therefore,
take actions more akin to registration. For example, once an examiner has
found a statement in the patent that the invention is useful, she simply accepts
the statement as sufficient to satisfy the utility requirement of
patentability.237 This is a registration system: the applicant must fulfill the
administrative requirement of including a statement of utility; the PTO
verifies that the statement is present but does not investigate further.
The import of framing patent grant as a registration event, rather than an
examination event, is that many aspects of examination traditionally thought
to be assessed during prosecution are in fact deferred to litigation. In this
framing, courts and examiners are doing fundamentally different analyses, so
courts should not defer to examiner decisions.
This is different from the status quo. At present, patents granted by the
PTO are presumed to be valid and, in litigation, the challenger bears the
burden of proving that the patent is invalid.238 This assumption makes sense
under an examination system, because the PTO has already done an up-front
review.239 It does not make sense under a registration system, where the PTO
does a cursory assessment but relies on courts for in-depth review.
Instead of a presumption of validity, there should be a presumption of
matching. When a court reviews the validity of a granted patent, the court
would presume that the examiner matched correctly: that there are no prior
art references that anticipate or render obvious the patent in suit; that, for
enablement and written description, the content in the claims all appears
somewhere in the specification; and for utility, that the patent contains a
statement of utility. However, there would be no presumption that the
evidence reviewed by the examiner is correct—that is, there would be no
presumption of digging. The patentee would therefore bear the burden of
proving that the statement of utility is correct and that the statements
supporting the teachings of how to make and use the invention were also
correct.

237. See supra Part I.C.2.
238. See 35 U.S.C. § 282 (“A patent shall be presumed valid.”); see also Impax Lab’ys,
Inc. v. Aventis Pharms. Inc., 468 F.3d 1366, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“[T]he burden of
establishing invalidity as to any claim of a patent rests upon the party asserting such
invalidity.”).
239. Though the presumption has been criticized. See, e.g., John H. Barton, Reforming the
Patent System, 287 SCI. 1933, 1934 (2000); F. Scott Kieff, The Case for Preferring PatentValidity Litigation over Second-Window Review and Gold-Plated Patents: When One Size
Doesn’t Fit All, How Two Could Do the Trick, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1937, 1940 (2009);
Lichtman & Lemley, supra note 122, at 48; Sean B. Seymore, Heightened Enablement in the
Unpredictable Arts, 56 UCLA L. REV. 127, 159–60 (2008).
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2. Embrace Differences in Litigation and Prosecution
Currently, the standard for patentability is essentially the same in litigation
and in prosecution.240 However, the matching-digging dichotomy suggests
that evidence is processed in very different ways during prosecution and
litigation. If the PTO process looks more like registration than examination,
at least with respect to some tasks, having the same standards may not make
sense. Although currently many litigation doctrines mimic prosecution
doctrines,241 this should not be the case.
This section advocates for a decoupling of prosecution and litigation
doctrines using the example of two specific doctrines: constructive reduction
to practice and use of prophetic examples. These doctrines have been
highlighted by scholars as perplexing under current patent theory. However,
they are understandable (though not necessarily justifiable) if viewed as
mechanisms that allow examiners to take what would otherwise be a digging
task and transform it into a matching task. The doctrines accomplish this
goal but in doing so require examiners to take shortcuts in processing
evidence, which produces some unpleasant side effects and accounts for the
doctrines’ unpopularity among patent scholars. Understood this way, these
doctrines are a concession to the realities of examiner abilities, but they do
not achieve desirable ends in and of themselves. Therefore, they should be
permitted during prosecution but viewed with more skepticism during
litigation.
The doctrine of constructive reduction to practice allows patents to be
granted on inventions that have never been physically created.242 The
doctrine of prophetic examples allows evidence of patentability to be
provided in the form of fictional experiments.243 These doctrines are widely
unpopular with scholars and difficult to rationalize because they appear to
encourage patents on technologies that do not work and incentivize
disclosure of inaccurate information.244 Further, scholars have struggled to
explain the purpose behind the doctrine.245
240. Although some rules, such as the standard for claim construction, are different. The
standard at the PTO is the broadest reasonable interpretation, whereas courts take a narrower
approach. See, e.g., Jason Rantanen, “Broadest Reasonable Interpretation” and Appellate
Review 7 (Aug. 3, 2016) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2816134 [https://perma.cc/WA7T-RRC6].
241. Some such doctrines are discussed below. See infra notes 242–52 and accompanying
text.
242. See Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
243. Freilich, supra note 134, at 666; Freilich & Larrimore Ouellette, supra note 121, at
1036.
244. See, e.g., Christopher A. Cotropia, The Folly of Early Filing in Patent Law, 61
HASTINGS L.J. 65, 67–68 (2009); Robin Feldman, Plain Language Patents, 17 TEX. INTELL.
PROP. L.J. 289, 292 (2009); Freilich, supra note 134 at 687–92; Timothy R. Holbrook,
Equivalency and Patent Law’s Possession Paradox, 23 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 9 (2009);
Freilich & Larrimore Ouellette, supra note 121, at 1036; Larrimore Ouellette, supra note 121,
at 1830; Seymore, supra note 239, at 131; see also Mark A. Lemley, Ready for Patenting, 96
B.U. L. REV 1171, 1178 (2016).
245. See 2 R. CARL MOY, MOY’S WALKER ON PATENTS § 8:93 (4th ed. 2017) (calling the
doctrine of constructive reduction to practice “an attempt to provide a theoretical basis for a
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Viewing these practices through the lens of the matching-digging
dichotomy suggests that they exist because they permit examiners to search
for evidence in the specification but do not require examiners to dig into the
reliability of the evidence.
When assessing a patent application, examiners must determine whether
the invention has been reduced to practice. Because reduction to practice is
defined as filing a patent application on the claimed invention,246 this is a
matching analysis. The examiner need only check whether the invention is
in fact described in the patent application. This means looking at the
invention as defined in the claims and matching it to content in the
specification.247 Because there is no requirement that an invention be
physically created, examiners need not check whether the invention actually
exists, was actually made by the inventor, or actually works, thus allowing
examiners to avoid an analysis that would involve digging into the reliability
of the evidence. Similarly, because applicants are permitted to use prophetic
examples, examiners need not ask whether data is real or whether the
experiment works (digging tasks). Instead, they need only ask whether data
is present (matching tasks).248 The doctrines can therefore be explained as
mechanisms to convert what would otherwise be digging tasks into matching
tasks that better fit the capabilities of patent examiners.
These doctrines make some sense in the context of prosecution, as they
avoid requiring examiners to conduct digging tasks that the examiners cannot
do. But the standards are the same in litigation: a patent will be upheld in
litigation even if it covers technology that was never physically made, and
prophetic examples are permissible.249 This may be the wrong standard.
Because courts have the capacity to distinguish between inventions that are
constructively reduced to practice and inventions that are physically reduced
to practice, it would be reasonable to implement a standard that allows them
to do so, such as a working requirement for patents250 or a doctrine requiring
problematic practice of the PTO”); John Duffy, Reviving the Paper Patent Doctrine, 98
CORNELL L. REV. 1359, 1370 (2013) (“[T]he Patent Office had little or no ability to investigate
the underlying physical reality of inventions.”).
246. See Hybritech Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc., 802 F.2d 1367, 1376 (Fed. Cir.
1986); Bigham v. Godtfredsen, 857 F.2d 1415, 1417 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (explaining that filing a
patent application constitutes constructive reduction to practice as long as disclosure standards
are met).
247. See supra Part III.A.
248. The PTO itself has suggested that this explanation underlies the presence of prophetic
examples, though without framing the explanation in matching-digging terms: the PTO
explained that clarity as to whether test results are “paper” or “working” is essential because
examiners have “little or no resources to test the veracity of representations made by
applicants.” MPEP § 608.01(p) (4th ed. Rev. 5, Jan. 1981).
249. See Atlas Powder Co. v. EI Du Pont De Nemours, 750 F.2d 1569, 1577 (Fed. Cir.
1984).
250. A working requirement would mandate physical creation (or even use or manufacture)
of the invention. Working requirements exist in other jurisdictions and are frequently
discussed by scholars as a solution to certain problems with the patent system. See, e.g.,
Cotropia, supra note 209, at 1551–53; Mayaan Perel, From Non-practicing Entities (NPES)
to Non-practiced Patents (NPPS): A Proposal for a Patent Working Requirement, 83 U. CIN.
L. REV. 747, 747–48 (2014); Ted Sichelman, Commercializing Patents, 62 STAN. L. REV. 341,
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that, by the time of litigation, patentees must be able to substantiate the
patent’s statement of utility through outside evidence. It might be difficult
for paper patents—patents describing products that have never been reduced
to practice—to satisfy this standard.251 However, that is a feature of the
proposal, not a bug, because paper patents are precisely the sort that should
be easier to challenge and harder to defend in court. Paper patents are more
likely to be used by patent trolls in abusive litigation.252
A similar limit could apply to prophetic examples: they could be used to
show enablement in prosecution but, by the time of litigation, patentees
would need to show enablement using real, not fictional, evidence. Courts
should not feel bound by the PTO’s rule accepting certain types of evidence
without scrutiny. As a general principle, because the PTO and courts
evaluate evidence in starkly different ways, PTO evidentiary practices will
often be inappropriate in litigation.
C. A Roadmap for Automation
The matching-digging analysis yields a final mechanism for reform:
automation and artificial intelligence. Patent examiners are already stretched
for time and would struggle to add additional analysis to their review of
applications.253 Adding additional patent examiners to give them more time
for review would be costly. How, then, to improve patent quality without
excessively increasing cost?
This Article frames most examiner work as matching tasks. This has two
payoffs in the context of automation. First, computers are particularly good
at matching-type tasks. Indeed, software is already involved in helping
examiners match statements in the patent to statements in prior art through
the use of search software.254 If artificial intelligence could take over
examiner matching tasks, human intelligence could be redeployed to more
complex digging tasks. Examiner time could therefore be devoted to
evaluating the evidence that artificial systems produce.
Second,
understanding examination as a series of matching tasks makes the process
394 (2010); Marketa Trimble, Patent Working Requirements: Historical and Comparative
Perspectives, 6 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 483, 483 (2016).
251. But not impossible—there may be ample prefiling evidence that the invention was
useful and adequately described in the specification. For a discussion of paper patents, see
UMC Elecs. Co. v. United States, 816 F.2d 647, 664–65 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (Smith, J.,
dissenting).
252. See Duffy, supra note 245, at 1359 (arguing that courts should revive a doctrine
“which had authorized courts to discriminate against patents that were never successfully
practiced by their patentees”).
253. See, e.g., Lauren Cohen et al., “Troll” Check?: A Proposal for Administrative Review
of Patent Litigation, 97 B.U. L. REV. 1775, 1781 (2017) (explaining that, given the number of
patent applications filed every year, “one cannot reasonably expect the USPTO to perform
more than a relatively cursory examination of patents before they issue”).
254. Sophisticated search systems, such as those used to find prior art, often involve
artificial intelligence. For further discussion of the use of algorithms and machine learning at
the PTO, see generally Arti K. Rai, Machine Learning at the Patent Office: Lessons for
Patents and Administrative Law, 104 IOWA. L. REV. 2617 (2019).
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of examination more readily adaptable to algorithmic analysis. The
conceptualization introduced by this Article may guide the creation of
examination software.
CONCLUSION
There are two steps to assessing evidence: matching—determining
whether evidence exists—and digging—determining whether an existing
piece of evidence should be believed. Patent examiners assess patentability
by searching for evidence but not by digging into the reliability of evidence.
Examiners therefore determine whether evidence relating to patentability
exists but do not ask whether it is of good quality. Framing the examination
process in this way provides insight into why several paradoxical patent
doctrines exist, predicts widespread errors in the patent system, and guides
policy solutions.
Beyond implications for patent scholars, lawyers, and policymakers, the
matching-digging dichotomy also offers important insights for users of the
patent system about what a patent actually is. Scientists, investors,
journalists, and technology enthusiasts often point to patents as proof that an
invention works. After all, the patent has been examined by an expert and
certified by the government as useful and enabled.255 Unfortunately, patent
grant does not actually tell us much about whether an invention is useful or
works. Viewed in light of the matching-digging dichotomy, patent grant
demonstrates that the patent has been through a minimal screen and contains
a threshold amount of information about how the inventor believes the
invention would work. Patent grants say very little about the underlying
technology.
Conceptualizing the examination process as a series of matching tasks
allows sharper analysis of patent content, examination procedures, and
litigation doctrines. The current practice of restricting examination to
matching is not a failure but is a feature whose consequences reverberate
throughout the patent system. The matching-digging dichotomy is therefore
an essential tool for efforts to understand and reform the patent system.

255. Theranos investors were swayed by the company’s many patents, as were potential
Theranos employees; both groups believing that the patents indicated that the underlying
technology was solid. See Daniel Nazer, Theranos: How a Broken Patent System Sustained
Its Decade-Long Deception, ARS TECHNICA (Mar. 4, 2019), https://arstechnica.com/techpolicy/2019/03/theranos-how-a-broken-patent-system-sustained-its-decade-long-deception/
[https://perma.cc/D277-GA43].

